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WHAT'S THE APPEAL? TRYING TO CONTROL MANAGED CARE
MEDICAL NECESSITY DECISIONMAKING THROUGH
A SYSTEM OF EXTERNAL APPEALS
AARON SETH KESSELHEIM t
[Ralph] Benedetto, 44, a disabled Medicaid patient, contracted hepa-
titis B 10 years ago from a blood transfusion he received after he was
struck by a drunken driver. Two years ago, his doctors said his disease
had progressed to the point where he could die at any moment without
a liver transplant. But his health maintenance organization refused to
pay for the treatment.
The H.M.O.... cited guidelines issued by the state of Florida rec-
ommending against liver transplants to hepatitis B patients ....
[But elxperts say there is now wide agreement that hepatitis B, in and
of itself, is no longer a valid reason to deny someone a liver transplant.
In the end... the case had prompted senior agency officials to make
an immediate change in the agency's rule on hepatitis B [and the
H.M.O. had agreed to move forward with the transplant] ... [b]ut now
Mr. Benedetto may no longer be a viable candidate.'
INTRODUCTION
Armed with Mr. Benedetto's story and similar anecdotes, the
United States Senate and House of Representatives each passed land-
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mark patient protection legislation during the 106th Congress" to
support the interests of Americans who receive their health insurance
from a managed care organization ("MCO"). 3 MCOs had grown in
popularity through the 1980s and 1990s due in part to their promise
to reduce medical costs by contractually restricting payment to medi-
cal treatment that they considered to be "medically necessary."' As a
centerpiece of their new patient protection efforts, however, federal
legislators have granted MCO enrollees the right to appeal such deni-
2 For the Senate Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, see S. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999).
For the House of Representatives Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement
Act of 1999, see H.R 2723, 106th Cong. (1999). Because significant differences be-
tween the two acts remain, a consensus bill has not yet received the President's signa-
ture. See Chris Black & Associated Press, Senate Democrats Push for Vote on Patient's Bill of
Rights (June 7, 2000) (noting the "[firustration over the continued stalemate on a bi-
partisan patients' rights bill"), http://wvw.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/06/
07/patients.bill. For further discussion of the differences between the two bills, see
infra note 189. Senate Republicans attached an attempted compromise patients' bill of
rights to a Labor, Health and Human Services spending bill in the 2000 term, but dis-
agreements with members of the House ultimately doomed that effort as well. See
Dana Bash, Senate Passes Limited 'Bill of Rights'for Patients (June 29, 2000) ("The leading
House Republican ... called the new Senate-backed legislation unacceptable."),
http://ww.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/06/29/senate.patients.bill. For
the Senate's Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, see H.R. 4577, 106th Cong. (2000).
A managed care organization is:
[A]ny health coverage arrangement in which, for a pre-set fee .... a company
sells a defined package of benefits to a purchaser, with services furnished to
enrolled members through a network of participating providers who operate
under written contractual or employment agreements, and whose selection
and authority to furnish covered benefits is controlled by the managed care
company.
RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE A.NMERICAN HEALTH CARE SISTEM 551-52
(1997) (emphasis omitted). MCOs include health maintenance organizations, pre-
ferred payer organizations, and similarly structured forms of managed care medical
insurance. See Eric R. Wagner, Types of Managed Care Organizations, in PETER R.
KONGSTVEDT, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 36-48 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE] (describing the different types of MCOs).
The federal patient protection laws proposed in 1999 and 2000 covered the 140 mil-
lion privately insured Americans in MCOs. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra, at 544 (ghi-
ing the 1995-1996 enrollment statistics for MCOs). A significant percentage of Ameri-
cans receiving government-sponsored health insurance through Medicaid and
Medicare are also enrolled in MCOs, but federal law already provides these enrollees
with a meaningful independent appeals process. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Protecting Con-
sumers and Providers Under Health Reform: An Overview of the Major Administrative Law Is-
sues, 5 HEALTH MATRIx 83, 87-109 (1995) (reviewing the federal constitutional and
administrative protections available to aggrieved patients enrolled in Medicaid- and
Medicare-sponsored MCOs); see also sources cited infra note 44 (discussing further the
appeals process open to Medicare- and Medicaid-MCO enrollees).
4 Infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text (detailing the cost-containment tactics
of MCOs).
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als of insurance coverage and have established independent review
organizations to judge the true necessity of the medical service.?
Consumer advocates had long endorsed the concept of inde-
pendent review organizations to which patients could appeal their
MCO's medical necessity determinations as a way of ensuring the sci-
entific basis of such determinations.6 Commentators had envisioned
neutral arbitration panels empowered to analyze the relevant objec-
tive scientific evidence in order to ensure that MCOs were not violat-
ing their enrollee contracts and denying patients medically necessary
care.7 For patients othenise trapped in the red tape of their MCO-
such as Mr. Benedetto-a well delineated, timely appeals procedure
and an impartial mediator could help overturn potentially life-threat-
ening decisions.
As evidenced by the specific provisions enacting the external ap-
peal privilege, however, federal legislators were not satisfied simply to
grant patients the right to appeal to a neutral, third-party decision-
maker.' The language of both federal patient protection bills is strik-
ing in its departure from the commentators' conception of an appeals
body as a neutral, scientific adjunct. Rather, the House and Senate
bills expand the right to appeal and secure the superiority of the pa-
tients' position in the appeals process through such tactics as explicitly
Se Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, S. 1344, 106th Cong. § 121(503) (e) (1999)
(delineating the right to independent external review); Bipartisan Consensus Managed
Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. § 103 (1999) (same). Federal
legislators patterned these independent review provisions after legislative efforts that
had been enacted by most states in the three preceding years. See sources cited infra
note 14 (providing a comprehensive list of the laws enacted in over thirty states estab-
likhing and delineating the authority of independent review organizations).
", S, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Models of Rationing: Health Insurers'
As,%smrnt of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1682-1711 (1992) (discussing
alternatihe contractually based solutions to questions of determining medical neces-
sity).
For a discussion of patient advocates' views on the role of external independent
iev iew organizations, see generally Impact of External Review on Health Care Quality:
Harng Bifort the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Educ. and the
W,,rforr, Comm. 106th Cong. 6-8 (1999) [hereinafter Impact of External Review Hearing]
(statement of Geraldine Dallek).
I See infra notes 157-89 and accompanying text (reviewing the provisions of the
Senate and House patient protection bills and analyzing the wide ranging authority
given to independent review organizations); see also William M. Welch, 'Medical Neces-
sit_ P Crux of Health Debate: Senate to Consider Two Competing Bills, USA TODAY, July 12,
1999, at 14A ("[The federal legislation] is designed to ensure 'that medical decisions
are going to be made by the trained medical professionals and the patients, not by ac-
countants and insurance companies.'" (quoting Senator Edward G. Kennedy)).
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assigning burdens of proof for external reviews,' listing sources and
types of evidence on which the reviewers must rely,'(. and giving inde-
pendent reviewers wide-ranging authority to overturn MCO coverage
determinations." For example, the House Bipartisan Consensus
Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 requires external reviewers
to make a "fair and de novo" determination, lists the types of evidence
the reviewers should consider, and notes that the reviewers are not
bound by the definitions of "medical necessity" included in the health
plan's insurance contract.'2 What happened to the modest goals and
the neutral, scientific ideal that characterized the movement toward
independent review organizations?
This Comment examines the origin and evolution of the laws that
permit appeals of MCO determinations to external bodies in order to
explain the astonishing adversarial stance seen in the recent legislative
efforts. Such historical analysis suggests that Republican and Demo-
cratic 3 legislators' implicit goal in creating external appeals systems is
to use independent review organizations as proxies for taking medical
decisionmaking control away from MCOs and returning it to physi-
cians. This Comment suggests, however, that because of inherent
shortcomings in the external appeals system, granting MCO enrollees
the right of independent review is not an appropriate means of
achieving that end. Part I details the emergence of MCOs and patient
advocates' concomitant efforts to promulgate external grievance pro-
cedures for MCO enrollees. Part II investigates representative exam-
ples of state laws instituting the right to appeal adverse MCO benefit
determinations to independent review organizations. While before
See, e.g., Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R.
2723, 106th Cong. § 103(b) (2) (A) (making the external appeal determination "de
novo").
10 See, e.g., id. § 103(b) (2) (D) (i)-(ii) (listing sources on which independent review-
ers must rely in determining the medical necessity of a particular treatment plan).
" See, e.g., id. § 103(b) (2) (C) (asserting that the independent review organization
is not bound by any MCO contractual definitions of "medical necessity" when making
its determination).
12 Id. § 103(b) (2) (A)-(D).
' Republicans and Democrats disagree over many aspects of what rights should be
included in patient protection legislation, especially on the federal level. See, e.g., Bash,
supra note 2 (describing the differences between the primarily Democratic-sponsored
bill and Republican-backed versions of the Patients' Bill of Rights and indicating the
stark partisan rhetoric surrounding the outstanding issues). Both sides of the political
spectrum, however, seem to agree on the need for an external appeals process, be-
cause it has been a significant part of acts authored by Republicans and Democrats at
the state and federal levels. This Comment does not purport to take a political stance
on the various patients' rights legislative efforts as a whole.
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1997 only Rhode Island had an official external review process, by
1999 thirty states and the District of Columbia had established rights
to external review for private health plan enrollees. l This Part reveals
how state legislators generally expanded the rhetorical and actual
scope of authority of independent review organizations over time.
Part III looks at the development of patient protection acts proposed
in the United States Congress during the same time frame.'! Part IV
posits an explanation for the trend toward granting independent re-
view organizations more authority to overturn MCO "medically neces-
sary" determinations, characterizing it as an attempt by legislatures to
impose a fee-for-service regime onto the managed care health care
coverage system. Finally, Part IV also interprets legislative efforts to
" S,', r.g., AxIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-2537 (Supp. 2000) (granting MCO enrollees the
right to appeal adverse MCO coverage determinations to an independent review or-
ganization); CL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4 (West Supp. 2000) (same); COLO.
REv. SiAT. § 10-16-113.5 (1999) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-226c (Supp. 1999)
(same); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-571.7 (Supp. 2000) (same); FLA. STAT. § 408.7056 (Supp.
2010) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-39 (2000) (same); HAW. REv. STAT. § 432E-6
(Supp. 1999) (same); 215 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 134/45 (Supp. 2000) (same); IND. CODE
§ 27-13-10.1-1 (Supp. 2000) (same); IOWA CODE § 514J.1-.14 (Supp. 1999) (same);
KvN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3228 (Supp. 1999) (same); LA REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:3081 (West
Supp. 2000) (same); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-IOA-05 (Supp. 2000) (same); MICH.
Cowls. LAWs § 333.21035 (Supp. 2000) (same); MINN. STAT. § 62Q.73 (Supp. 2000)
(same); Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1387 (Supp. 1999) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-
303 (1999) (same); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.7 (Supp. 1999) (same); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59A-57-4 (Michie Supp. 2000) (same); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914 (Consol. Supp.
21(10) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62 (1999) (same); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1753.24 (Anderson Supp. 1999) (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.1 (Supp. 1999)
(same); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162 (1999) (same); R.I. GEN. LANWs § 23-17.12-10
(Supp. 1999) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-32-227 (Supp. 1999) (same); TEx. INS.
CODE ANN. § 20A.12 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089d
(Supp. 2000) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5901 (Michie Supp. 2000) (same); S. 140-
299, 2d Sess., at I (Del. 2000) (same).
' Patient advocates considered such federal protection necessary to extend the
right of independent review of medical necessity determinations to all Americans en-
rolled in MCOs and to avoid possible federal law preemption of the state legislative
efforts. The federal law that patient advocates feared would preempt state legislative
efforts was the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1994), which spares employer-sponsored MCOs-two-thirds of all MCO enrol-
lees are covered by MCOs through their employers-from regulation by state insur-
ance, contract, tort, and other law. See ROSENBLTT ET AL., supra note 3, at 160-61.
The fear of ERISA preemption was realized in Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas
Dtpartment of hIsurance, 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998), affid in part, rev'd in part,
215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000) where the court struck down a Texas state law instituting
the right of independent review of adverse MCO "medically necessary" determinations
because the relevant provision "related to" the services offered by the state's ERISA-
co~ered MCOs. Id. at 611-14. For further discussion of ERISA's influence on the de-
x clopment of MCO enrollees' right of independent review, see sources cited infra note
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institute interventionist external appeals processes as a futile attempt
at improving health care delivery to the vast majority of people in
managed care systems, and explains that the attempt fails because of
procedural and theoretical deficiencies in the appeals system.
I. MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE APPEALS PROCESS
This Part tracks the development of the external appeals mecha-
nism as it emerged in response to changing American health care re-
imbursement practices. First, it examines traditional fee-for-service
health insurance and the principal justifications for the MCOs that led
the managed care revolution in the late 1980s and early 1990s."' Sec-
ond, it focuses on one novel MCO practice, prospective and concur-
rent utilization review, in which MCO officers review prescribed medi-
cal services to ensure that enrollees receive only those that are truly
"medically necessary." This practice leads many to call for a mecha-
nism by which MCO enrollees could appeal such determinations to
independent, neutral experts, thus ensuring that MCOs were not pri-
oritizing cost-containment and profitability over the health of their
enrollees. 7 Third, this Part analyzes the efforts of legal commentators
and champions of patients' rights who suggested certain substantive
and procedural features fundamental to an equitable appeals proc-
ess." Ultimately, patient advocates found widespread success, as over
thirty states and, most recently, the U.S. Congress, passed legislation
setting up the right to external appeal.'
A. The Evolution of Health Care Insurers' Control
over Physician Decisionmaking
In the traditional "fee-for-service" design of reimbursement for
medical services, health care providers charged a certain fee for each
'6 See infra Part L.A (arguing that the pursuit of cost-containment led MCOs to be-
come the dominant payers for health care by the early 1990s).
" See infra Part I.B (describing consumer advocates' concerns with the tactics used
by MCOs to limit expenditures on health care).
"' See infra Part I.C (outlining commentators' and patient advocates' visions for an
appeals process that would help curb the perceived cost-containment excesses of man-
aged care).
19 See supra note 14 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 76 (giv-
ing a brief overview of the degree to which MCO enrollees' right to appeal adverse
"medically necessary" benefit determinations to an independent review organization
has been codified by state legislatures).
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aspect of the medical care they rendered, and patients generally en-
tered into contracts with indemnity insurers to cover their medical
costs."' The physician prescribed a course of treatment and then un-
dertook to deliver that care, submitting the bill to the insurer after the
completion of the medical service." While indemnity insurers reim-
bursed physicians only for services considered "medically necessary,"
two features of the fee-for-service system helped avoid disputes over
reimbursement and the propriety of physician prescription practices.
First, fee-for-service insurers by nature examined the medical necessity
of a particular treatment only after the patient had received it." Sec-
ond, traditional insurers usually abided by the health care provider's
judgment as to the proper medical care, rarely denying payment for
services.i ' Thus, under the fee-for-service system, providers freely un-
dertook the medical treatments or procedures they thought necessary.
While fee-for-service medicine emphasized the primacy of the
provider/patient relationship by not questioning the health care pro-
vider's prescribed course of action, the fact that reimbursement for
physicians was not limited to those services that were medically neces-
sary undeniably provided an incentive for physicians to overuse medi-
cal resources. -' Partly as a result, by the early 1980s, the health care
" Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What Are the Issues?, 26
SETON HALL L. REv. 1007, 1009 n.1 (1996) ("Under traditional indemnity insurance
and fee-for-service medical practices, the insurers enter into a contract with the in-
sured part, and reimburse the individual for certain medical expenses that are in-
curred.").
" See Scott Thornton, Comment, The Texas Health Care Liability Act: Managed Care
Oiganizations Can Say Goodbye to Their Extensive Immunity from Lawsuits-or at Least That
Was How It Was Supposed to Work, 30 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1227, 1231 (1999) (describing
the fee-for-service system and noting that "[tihe entity receiving the request for pay-
ment considered the necessity of the treatment only after the service had been per-
formed").
' SeeJennifer E. Gladieux, Medicare+Choice Appeal Procedures: Reconciling Due Process
Rights and Cost Containment, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 71 (1999) (describing differences
between traditional fee-for-service and managed care delivery of health care).
" Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gall H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations: The
N,,edfor a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MNATRIX 3, 5 (1996) (describing the "traditional
medico-legal system" as one in which "health care providers were expected to act in
the best interests of the patient... [and] [i]nsurers paid for such care without ques-
tion").
S e Peter R. Kongstvedt, Compensation of Primary Care Physicians in Open Panel
Plans, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 130 (noting that "[ifn
a system where economic reward is predicated on how much one does.., it is only
human nature to do more, especially when it pays more"). Other features of the
American health care system also contributed to the over-prescription of medical serv-
ices. For example, many commentators point to the rise of medical malpractice law-
suits from the 1960s to the 1980s that led many physicians toward "defensive medi-
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system generated massive costs-reaching 13.5% of America's total
gross domestic product-that threatened the continued availability of
health insurance to Americans.' Consequently, in the late 1980s,
managed care organizations grew in popularity among purchasers of
health insurance because of the managed care industry's promise to
rein in the costly excesses of the fee-for-service insurance system.!*"
MCOs offered enrollees lower cost health insurance by exerting
more control than their indemnity insurance competitors over the de-
27livery of medical services. MCOs restrained "the kind, volume, and
manner in which services are provided"28 either directly through rules
and organizational controls limiting the options available to health
care providers or indirectly by modifying health care providers' behav-
ior through financial incentives.29  MCOs implemented cost-saving
strategies across the entire spectrum of health care delivery, including
fixing payments for services" and limiting access to more expensive
medical specialists. 3' Most significantly, however, MCOs worked to
eliminate excessive services through a stronger commitment to review-
ing care recommended by physicians and refusing to authorize treat-
cine," an implicit practice of prescribing often arcane and redundant medical tests and
procedures to avoid missing even the most improbable of medical diagnoses. See
MICHAEL E. MAKOVER, MISMANAGED CARE 165-68 (1998) (discussing defensive medi-
cine and its effect on increasing costs of health care). Furthermore, the increasing use
of novel and expensive medical care treatments, diagnostic tools, and procedures
made the most routine medical examinations much more costly. See Michael J. Mali-
nowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and the Advent of a New Era in Medical
Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 341 (1996) ("The paradox of medical technology is
that, though it is responsible for alleviating human suffering and disease, it also is re-
sponsible for raising health care costs.").
See Matthew Miller, Political Malpractice, TIME, July 26, 1999, at 60, 60-61 (explain-
ing the key issues in current political efforts to control the massive costs resulting from
giving doctors "unfettered discretion" over medical necessity decisions); see also
MAKOVER, supra note 24, at 13 (describing the basis for rapid and uncontrolled in-
creases in health care costs during the 1970s and 1980s).
26 See MAKOVER, supra note 24, at 16 (noting, but disagreeing with, the managed
care industry's contention that "it has succeeded very well in controlling costs").
1' Rodwin, supra note 20, at 1009 n.1 (defining managed care as "health insurance
combined with the controls over the delivery of health services").
a Id.
See Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform Propos-
als, and Trade-Offs, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1319, 1324-25 (1996) (describing the direct effect
of MCO cost-containment strategies on physician incentives to prescribe services).
0 See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 435-36 (1988) (explaining how fixing
payments in advance cuts costs).
3' See Rodwin, supra note 29, at 1328 (describing gatekeeping as a cost-containment
practice whereby patients' access to more costly specialists is limited by requiring pa-
tients' primary care physicians first to authorize such visits).
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ments deemed unnecessary. "2 The next section focuses on the contro-
versy created by the strategy MCOs used to limit medical services to
those that are "medically necessary"-a process known as "utilization
review"-and then describes the subsequent support for an external
appeals system to guard against potential abuses of the utilization re-
View process.
B. MCO Utilization Review and the Calfor
Independent Review Mechanisms
Utilization reiew refers to the practice of analyzing the medical
procedures, treatments, or services prescribed by health care provid-
ers to ensure that they are neither improper nor frivolous under the
circumstances. ' Akin to those of indemnity insurers, MCO contracts
typically covered only benefits that they considered "medically neces-
S,, ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 3, at 212 (explaining that MCOs' "use[] [of]
the medical necessity... criteri[on] to question the treating physician's judgment"
first arose in the late 1970s, while previously "[miany insurance policies did not even
contain language excluding medically unnecessary... care"). The rise of the MCOs'
medical neces.sity criterion has been explained as follows:
Several factors have combined to [promote the use of a medical necessity
criterion by MCOs]. The most obvious has been the sharp health care cost
increases from 1965 to the present, and consequent pressure on employers
and government to use more aggressive techniques to deny claims. Second,
medical technology has developed a number of highly expensive and hazard-
ous treatments for severe illness-such as organ and bone marrow trans-
plants2-whose efficacy in some circumstances is open to question. Third, re-
search comparing geographical differences in the rates at which doctors use
certain procedures has found large differentials without clear justification in
patient demographics or outcomes.
Id. at 212-13. In addition to studies showing disparate provision of medical care in dif-
ferent geographic areas, other research indicated that nearly 12,000 Americans died in
one )ear from unnecessary surgeries. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., COST AND
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE: UNNECESSARY SURGERY (Comm. Print 1976) (finding that
11,900 deaths occurred from unnecessary surgeries in 1975); see also Richard I. Smith,
P, & Con: I2 Search of Fairness in Patient Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1999, at F7 (support-
ing MCOs' utilization review tactics in the context of arguing that patients should not
be able to sue their health plans). These studies indicated that health care providers,
when given autonomy in making determinations about medical necessity, were not us-
ing scientific principles in their decisionmaking. Through utilization review, health
plans intended to "improv[e] the medical knowledge ... available to practicing physi-
cians." Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 20.
S, ROSENBLTT ET AL., supra note 3, at 377-78 (explaining that the function of a
utilization review committee was "to review the medical necessity of hospitalization,
length of stay, and professional services"); see alsoJack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins:
ERIS,l HMO) Malpractire. and Enterpise Liability, 22 AM.J.L. & MED. 7,22-25 (1996) (de-
scribing private utilization review as a cost-cutting tool).
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sary" -- excluding, for example, experimental care, nonstandard
treatments, treatments without any known benefits, and cosmetic sur-
ger-y-and, like traditional insurers, MCOs reviewed physician treat-
ment plans to enforce the "medically necessary" standard. Whereas
the utilization review process employed by indemnity insurers was ret-
rospective and largely dormant in practice, 5 MCOs expanded the role
of utilization review in determining health care coverage. MCOs con-
tinued to engage in retrospective review by examining providers'
medical decisionmaking for overuse of services, such as referrals to
specialists. 36 Yet MCOs went further, establishing systems of prospec-
tive and concurrent utilization review for most medical services. : The
system of prospective utilization review mandated that health care
providers approve the initiation-or, in the case of concurrent review,
the continuation-of medical treatment for individual enrollees. Pro-
viders were required to contact the MCO, whose utilization reviewers
analyzed the propriety of the suggested regimen for the particular pa-
tient's circumstances based on a set of predetermined criteria." Thus,
through the prospective and concurrent methodologies, the MCO's
review and subsequent refusal of authorization could lead to the
prompt end or complete prevention of a treatment regimen deemed
unnecessary. 9
See Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical
Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1055, 1056 (1996) (recount-
ing MCOs' standard definition of medical necessity).
' See supra text accompanying notes 22-23 (describing the two key features of in-
demnity insurers' review of physician decisionmaking regarding treatment alterna-
tives).
' See Clifton Perry, When Medical Need Exceeds Medical Resource and When Medical
Want Exceeds Medical Need, 21 W. ST. U. L. REv. 39, 51-52 (1993) (describing how health
plans use retrospective utilization review to influence physician practices).
" See Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal Accountability for Utilization Review in ERISA Health
Plans, 77 N.C. L. REV. 731, 741 (1999) (outlining the three different varieties of utiliza-
tion review).
For a detailed description of the prospective utilization review process, see
INsTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLUING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT GC.RE? THE
ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 17-18 (Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Field eds.,
1989). See generally Thornton, supra note 21, at 1232 (discussing utilization review and
noting that "[t]hrough utilization review, MCOs evaluate the medical appropriateness
of care prescribed").
3" For an example of a denial under prospective utilization review, see Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying precertification
for a physician's recommended hospitalization of a woman with a high-risk preg-
nancy). For an example of a denial under concurrent utilization review, see McEvoV v.
Group Health Cooperative of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Wis. 1997) (discontinuing
coverage for the hospitalization of a patient with anorexia nervosa).
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In those cases where an MCO denied preauthorization for a par-
ticular service, but the enrollee, through her health care provider,
disputed the MCO's characterization of the service as "not medically
necessary," MCOs offered reconsideration through an internal appeal
process. MCOs' internal procedures varied somewhat, but most re-
tained the same basic features. After the initial adverse determina-
tion," most health plans empowered a physician, a more senior medi-
cal director, or a committee to hear patient grievances."' In McGraw v.
Prudential I surance Co. of America, the Tenth Circuit outlined Pruden-
tial's three-tiered review process for exclusion of services: "At the first
level, the local medical director decides whether the claim is covered
by the policy. A challenge of that decision then goes to Prudential's
regional medical director. At the third level, an appeals commit-
tee... may confirm or reverse the ... decision."4'3
Once enrollees in MCOs exhausted the internal appeals process,
enrollees who still believed in the necessity of the services sought by
their provider's medical plan found their options limited. If ag-
S , Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability
Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1219, 1230 (1997) (noting
that "many HMO contracts require patients to settle disputes through internal appeals
or arbitration").
" MCOs nearly alwas placed authority with a medically licensed officer to make
the initial determination. See Shuren, supra note 37, at 745-46 (describing the usual
process for initial denial of care by a utilization review organization).
Sec Margaret Gilhooley, Broken Back: A Patient's Reflections on the Process of Medical
N,,esity D,'temninations, 40 VILL. L. REv. 153, 171 (1995) (describing health plans' in-
ternal procedures for making initial "medical necessity" benefit determinations).
" 137 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998). In Benisek v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,
the District Court described the nature of the hearing process at Rush's final appeals
committee deliberation:
Rush Prudential's Membership Advisory Committee, comprised of an equal
number of Rush Prudential employees and insured employees who are en-
tirely independent of Rush Prudential, met on an expedited basis to consider
the appeal. Ms. Benisek, her attorney, and [the treating physician], via tele-
phone, was [sic] present at the meeting. [Rush Prudential's associate medical
director] once again recommended denial of coverage. At the conclusion of
the meeting, the committee voted unanimously by a 6-0 vote to uphold [Rush
Prudential's] denial of coverage.
No). 98-C1517, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10584, at .7-*8 (N.D. Ill.July 6, 1999). Although
Bvniwk inv olved a determination of whether a proposed therapeutic regimen was "ex-
perimental or investigational," rather than "necessary," the internal appeals process
as essentially the same. Id. at *8.
" Limitations on options after the internal appeals process applied only to enrol-
lees in private, personal, or employer-sponsored MCOs. MCO enrollees who received
their health insurance through the government or the federally mandated Medicare or
Medicaid health insurance programs had the statutory right to appeal adverse MCO
medical necessity determinations beyond the internal process to administrative law
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grieved enrollees tried to challenge their MCO's final decision in
court, the courts applied a deferential standard to the decisionmaking
body because the standard terms of health plan contracts gave admin-
istrators the power to make discretionary decisions regarding treat-
ment coverage.4 5 Furthermore, the courts have interpreted the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 19746 ("ERISA") to make
employer-sponsored MCOs ineligible for legal liability for any negative
consequences that later arose from omission of medical treatment due
to an adverse benefit determination.47
MCOs' interventionist utilization review processes and internal
appeals systems proved more effective than the retrospective review
employed by traditional indemnity insurers in reducing the over-
utilization of medical services that contributed to the high cost of
health care.4 s Despite MCOs' success in applying utilization review to
cut costs, however, consumer advocates soon charged MCOs with
abusing their own system by denying "medically necessary" services in
certain instances due to financial considerations instead of the medi-
judges. See Gordon Bonnyman, Jr. & Michele M. Johnson, Unseen Peril: Inadequate En-
rollee Grievance Protections in Public Managed Care Programs, 65 TENN. L. REv. 359, 370,
374-75 (1998) (noting that Medicaid recipients receive the same due process notice
and appeals protections for denials of recommended services as for other revocations
of means-tested government aid); Maria A. Morrison, The Impact of Grijalva v. Shalala
on the Medicare HMO Appeal Process and the Importance of Enforcing Appeal Process Regula-
tions, 103 DIcK. L. REv. 735, 737-41 (1999) (describing the recourse available to Medi-
care recipients when appealing adverse MCO benefit determinations under the Medi-
care Act and the Health Care Financing Administration's regulation of the Medicare
appeals process).
0 See Bernstein v. CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 787 (4th Cir. 1995) ("If the ad-
ministrator or fiduciary is given discretionary powers under the plan, his decisions are
reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed if they are reasonable.");
Mark A. Kadzielski et al., Managed Care Contracting: Pitfalls and Promises, 20 WHITTIER L.
REV. 385, 390 (1998) (noting that "generally, when disputes arise regarding coverage,
the standard of review under ERISA is 'abuse of discretion' where the plan has vested
the administrator with discretion to interpret and apply the terms of the plan").
Weighing in favorably to the patient, the Fourth Circuit noted that if the administrator
has a conflict of monetary interest, then that conflict is weighed into the "abuse of dis-
cretion" analysis. Bernstein, 70 F.3d at 787.
" 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
17 See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that "[tihe result ERISA compels us to reach means that the [injured parties]
have no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake"). In that
case, after an HMO authorized home nursing rather than hospitalization for a woman
with a high-risk pregnancy, the fetus went into distress and died while the nurse ws off
duty. Id. at 1321-22.
4" See PaulJ. Feldstein et al., Private Cost Containment: The Effects of Utilization Revi'w
Programs on Health Care Use and Expenditures, 318 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1310, 1314 (1988)
(describing an 8.7:1 cost-savings ratio for prospective utilization review).
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cal need of their beneficiaries.", Reports indicated frustration from
MCO enrollees and health care providers alike, and the perception of
abuse became more widespread. 0  Horror stories, such as Mr. Bene-
detto's,' followed in the media, recounting the adverse health conse-
quences of MCO enrollees resulting from red tape and seemingly ca-
pricious coverage denials.52 Patient advocates criticized the internal
grievance mechanisms for authorization denials as "slow and one-
sided," and looked skeptically upon the notion that MCO appeal
procedures offered a true reconsideration of the beneficiary's claim.54
To empower patients in, and reinforce the objectivity of, the medical
necessity determination process, many advocates supported establish-
ing a right for MCO enrollees to take appeals of MCOs' adverse de-
terminations to independent, external bodies of medical experts.55
"' & Hall & Anderson, supra note 6, at 1666 (pointing out that insurers' conflicts
of interest cast doubt on their ability to make unbiased "medical necessity" determina-
tions).
" So' Daxid Nather, Protecting the Patient: How Independent Review Could Force HMOs
t-, Bthav,,, WXSH. MONTHLY, July-Aug. 1998, at 28, 28 (reporting a Kaiser Family Foun-
dation study that 48% of enrollees said they have either had problems with their health
plan or know someone who has); Robin Toner, Many Doctors Tell of Denial of Coverage by
H.ALO. 7, N.Y. TIMES,July 29, 1999, at A18 (reporting a Kaiser Family Foundation study
of ph) sicians, in which one- to two-thirds of surveyed physicians reported recently hav-
ing had a denial of a proposed treatment regimen, leading to adverse health conse-
quences for the patient).
.1 See supra text accompanying note 1 (describing a patient's efforts to get his MCO
to approve a liver transplant, where scientific research had established the medical ne-
cessity of the procedure).
-2 Seg., David S. Hilzenrath, Final Say: One Patient's Ordeal WASH. POST, June 24,
118, at Al (recounting the story of a patient whose MCO did not approve his liver
transplant surgery until his condition had become inoperable); Laurie McGinley,
HMO Fracas Moves to 117io Makes Medical Decisions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1999, at A24 (re-
counting the case of a child with cerebral palsy whose physical therapy program was
denied by his MCO as not "medically necessary" because one study showed it would
not lead to marked improvement in his muscular deterioration); Joseph P. Shapiro,
S,,kin q a &ond Opinion: A New Law for Patients Whnen an HAMO Says No to Care, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 8, 1999, at 26 (describing an HMO's refusal to pay for nurs-
ing care for a child iith a respirator), ailment).
GeorgeJ. Annas, Patients'Rights in Managed Care-Exit, Voice, and Choice, 337 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 210, 214 (1997) (reporting that such appeals took an average of twenty-
eight months); see Hilzenrath, supra note 52, (quoting A. G. Neuwmyer III, head of the
Fair Care Foundation, a patient advocacy group, charging that MCO internal appeals
procedures "are structurally designed to take forever, to be as inconvenient as possible,
and to achieve the precise result that the insurers want-that is, to get the policyhold-
ers to simply give up").
I See Rod in, supra note 29, at 1342-43 (noting that "internal reviews are not likely
to question standards established by the organization").
I Sir, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROTECTION &
QtU LITY IN' THE HEALTH CARE INDUS., QUALITY FIRST: BETTER HEALTH CARE FOR ALL
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C. The Emergence of Independent Review Organizations
Health care experts have defined external review as "a formal dis-
pute resolution process, established by a state or federal agency to be
independent of disputing parties, that has the capacity to evaluate and
resolve at least those disputes involving medical issues."55 For man,
patients' rights advocates, external review for MCO adverse medical
necessity determinations held promise for both preserving access to
treatment in the medical marketplace57 and eliminating the perceived
implicit financial bias in MCO medical necessity decisionmaking.) In
addition to legitimating the internal appeal process by offering neu-
tral expertise, external review, because of its perceived ability to pro-
vide for the delivery of needed medical care to ill patients in an expe-
ditious fashion, offered further benefits over more traditional means
of dispute resolution such as adjudication. As a result, as managed
care increasingly dominated the medical marketplace, commentators
began calling for legislators to enact an external appeals process to
help protect patients' interests from the potentially biased medical
necessity decisionmaking of their MCOs. 6°
Advocates for such independent review organizations listed cer-
tain features as critical to the effectiveness of the reformed appeals
process. On a substantive level, they noted that the reviewers them-
selves should be "appropriately credentialed health care professionals
AMERICANS 161 [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N] ("Implementation of
independent external review systems by public and private purchasers of health care
services is an essential element in reducing the number of Americans injured by inap-
propriate coverage denials."); Nather, supra note 50, at 29 (quoting the Consumers
Union as considering external appeals the "linch-pin for all other consumer protec-
tions" in health care).
KAREN PoLLiTz ET AL., THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXTERNAL REVIEW OF
HEALTH PLAN DECISIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY PROGRAM FEATURES IN THE STATES
AND MEDICARE iii (Nov. 1998), reprinted in Impact of External Review Hearing, supra note 7
(appendix to statement of Geraldine Dallek).
-7 See Tracy E. Miller, Center Stage on the Patient Protection Agenda: Grievance and Ap-
peal Rights, 26J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89 (1998) (commenting that "[g]rievance and
appeal rights have been embraced as a way to empower patients, to enhance access to
treatment, and to improve the quality of care").
-s See Rodwin, supra note 20, at 1044-46 (describing the competing interests in-
volved in health plan benefit determinations).
" See Rhonda L. Rundle, External Review of HMO Decisions Becomes Hot Issue, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 3, 1998, at B2 (reporting widespread agreement that external review pro-
vides faster relief than a legal battle to critically ill patients who are at odds with their
health plan).
'0 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 38, at 6 (recommending the institu-
tionalization of external independent review organizations).
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who were not involved in the initial decision "6' and eligible disputes
should be limited to appeals of medical necessity or other clinical de-
terminations,';  so as not to overload the system and waste resources.
Commentators suggested giving the external reviewers enough
authority and discretion to "enable the patient to achieve the desired
outcome if, on the merits, the decision-maker concludes that the pa-
tient should prevail.""-'  They also recommended opening general
trends and anonymous results of the external appeals process for pub-
lic consideration to foster patient confidence in the process and re-
sponsiveness on the part of the MCO with regard to its general cover-
age policies.' On the issue of the substantive effect of the
independent reviewers' decisions, some patient advocates suggested
making reviewers' decisions binding on the health plan, but not on
the patient, to address the imbalance of power between the two par-
ties.
In addition to the basic substantive features of independent re-
view, consumer advocates emphasized the importance of providing
aggrieved MCO enrollees with an equitable procedure to promote sat-
isfaction with the independent reviewers' decision, even if the review-
ers ultimately supported the MCO's denial." For example, consumer
advocates supported giving enrollee representatives or state officials,
rather than the MCO, the authority to appoint the independent re-
PRESIDENT's ADmiSORY COMM'N, supra note 55, at 160.
For example, treatments judged experimental or investigational are also nor-
mally excluded from health plan coverage. SeeJulia Field Costich, Note, Denial of Cov-
,,agefor "Experimental" Medical Procedures: The Problem of De Novo Review Under ERISA, 79
K'. LJ. 801, 807-11 (1991) (describing the rationale for denial of benefits for experi-
mental or investigational therapeutic regimens).
" Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated Health Plans, 22
AM.J.L. & MED. 301,326 (1996).
,, Se Annas, supra note 53, at 214 (supporting making records available "for the
purpose of improvement... in the quality of care"); Gladieux, supra note 22, at 92
(noting that "external reviews open the appeal process to public scrutiny and increase
consumer confidence").
I Annas, supra note 53, at 214 (decrying the "imbalance of power" between pa-
tients and health insurers). A decision that is not binding on the patient allows the
patient to try to marshal new evidence and reappeal an), negative judgments. Still, the
requirement that MCOs abide by independent reviewers' ultimate determinations is
likely only a theoretical concern because, practically, any health plan noted to have a
propensity toward noncompliance doubtlessly will draw unwanted attention from state
licensing boards. See Miller, supra note 57, at 93 (noting that in New Jersey, the De-
partment of Health imestigates patterns of noncompliance).
-&te Kinney, supra note 63, at 326-27 (outlining the essential elements of a fair
griexance and dispute resolution procedure).
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viewers to a particular case67 to ensure the reviewers' neutrality." Pro-
fessor Eleanor Kinney outlined four key procedural elements to the
external appeals process, subsequent to reviewer selection:
First, there should be timely notice that appealable events have occurred
and of the procedures for appeal ....
Second, there should be prompt decisions by a knowledgeable, unbi-
ased decision-maker ....
Third, large areas for exercise of discretion should be accorded to
the decision-maker ....
Finally and perhaps most importantly, there should be methods for
empowering patients in the grievance process .... [such as an] informal
and comprehensible [procedure] .... [and] the option to be repre-
sented by counsel or other types of representative [s] ....
Kinney considered the provision of notice significant because of
information indicating that many managed care enrollees did not
even realize that they could appeal adverse decisions internally.''
Kinney's final recommendation also reflected concern for enrollees
who are unaware of their rights, because her proposal authorized pa-
tients to use representatives when patients confront their health
plan.71 Kinney's call for expediency in the face of medical need grew
out of concern regarding the time delays reported from the internal
process.72 Other patient advocates promoted additional procedural
67 See Nather, supra note 50, at 31 (indicating the that Consumers Union's solution
for keeping reviewers "honest" includes allowing the consumer or the state to choose
reviewers, or at least allowing the consumer to reject the MCO's choices).
See id. at 32 (promoting independence as a means of assuring impartiality and
promoting consumer confidence).
" Eleanor D. Kinney, Resolving Consumer Grievances in a Managed Care Environment
6 HEALTH MATRIX 147,162 (1996).
7 Cf Robert Pear, Government Says H.M.O.s Mislead Medicare Recipients, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1999, at A18 (discussing a General Accounting Office report that HMOs often
fail to inform their enrollees of the possibility for appeals).
71 Professor Kinney's final recommendation raised the issue of the role of health
care providers as advocates for the patient in the independent review process, espe-
cially considering their financial relationship to the health plan. In response, accom-
panying restraints have been proposed on health plans, such as preventing retaliation
by outlawing "gag rules" imposed by MCOs on physicians and barring "no-cause termi-
nation" of physician contracts. Miller, supra note 57, at 94 (noting policies put in place
to "promote [the] physician['s] role in informing patients and assisting them in the
appeal process"). See generally William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 Hous. L.
REV. 1529, 1571-74 (1999) (discussing the ethical conflicts faced by physicians in the
role of patient advocates before patients' MCOs).
72 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (pointing to time delays in internal ap-
peal processes as a major contributor to calls for instituting an external appeals proc-
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safeguards, such as the continuance of treatment during the time of
the appeal and the imposition of all costs on the insurer. 3
In the end, armed with the vision of an external review process
structured around the aforementioned substantive and procedural
proxisions, scholars and patient advocates pressed legislators to enact
the right to an external, independent appeal from adverse benefit de-
terminations.7  By the late 1990s, their advocacy had met with a large
measure of success" At the state level, thirty states now have laws
ss). The Health Care Financing Administration's ("HCFA") external appeals regula-
tion for Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MCOs served as a model of expediency for
many patient advocates, because it invoked a seventy-two hour process if the adverse
decision "rouidjeopardize the life or health of the enrollee or the enrollee's ability to
regain maximum function." Gladieux, supra note 22, at 77 (internal quotations omit-
ted; emphasis added); see also sources cited supra note 44 (discussing the different legal
cxternal appeals options available to Medicare recipients in MCOs as opposed to en-
r-dlee in prixate or employer-sponsored MCOs). HCFA adopted the less stringent
"ould" standard to compromise with consumer groups who wanted the beneficiary to
decide when the expedited process was appropriate. Gladieux, supra note 22, at 79-SO.
SSr Annas, supra note 53, at 214 (outlining various provisions he considers indis-
pensable to "quick, easy to use, and fair" dispute resolution mechanisms).
! t. e.g., Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 5 ("To prevent [harm to pa-
tients who are denied coverage], it is necessary for the law to recognize the true role
that health plans play in medical decision-making, and to develop mechanisms to ap-
propriately balance the societal interest in conserving resources with the individual
patient interest.").
;' This success in promoting the right to external appeal of MCO medical necessity
decisionmaking came despite numerous roadblocks. Some government actors and
MCOs at first opposed the creation of external review boards, claiming that a new layer
of bureaucracy and regulations would further drive up costs and lead back down the
road toward unaffordable health insurance. Nather, supra note 50, at 30 (noting
MCOs' initial suspicion of legislatively mandated external appeals procedures); Steve
Sternberg, /Thn Consumers Challenge Rulings of Health Plans, USA TODAY, Nov. 23, 1998,
at 6D (quoting Gail Wilensky, the former director of HCFA, as saying, "[it's easy to
legislate when you don't have to pay--Congress is wonderful at doing that"). Initial
models, howeer, indicated that the true costs would be less than expected. See
Nather, wipra note 50, at 30 (emphasizing the cost-effectiveness of external appeals by
pointing out that one consulting firm, Coopers & Lybrand, estimated the cost of the
independent appeals process at only ten cents per person per month).
Another major setback occurred when a Texas district court, in Corporate Health
lnuanc , hI. v. Texas Department of Insurance, struck down the external appeals provi-
sion in Texas's 1997 patient protection legislation as being preempted by ERISA be-
cause it improperly "mandate[s] the administration of employee benefits" in imposing
a course of conduct on ERISA plans. 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 625 (S.D. Tex. 1998), affid in
part, ,v'd in part, 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Thornton, supra note 21, at 1247
(explaining that ERISA regulates employee benefit plans-including employer-
sponsored health plans administered by MCOs-and preempts all state laws that "'re-
late to any employee benefit plan'" (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994))). Since the
Texas external appeals law required "an MCO to comply with the decision of the inde-
pendent reviewer and to pay for the review... 'the provisions for an independent re-
view improperly mandate the administration of employee benefits and therefore, have
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granting MCO enrollees the right to independent review" At the
federal level, support came in the form of the Senate Patients' Bill of
Rights Plus Act of 1999"7 and the House of Representatives Bipartisan
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.78
Following the procedural and substantive recommendations set
forth by legal commentators and patient advocates, the state and fed-
eral external appeals legislation shared numerous common provi-
sions. The archetypal statute required exhaustion of the MCO's in-
ternal appeals process before enrollees were qualified for an external
appeal, though some states allowed direct access in life-threatening
situations. Once the patient met the eligibility standards, most stat-
utes provided explicit instructions for notifying enrollees of their right
to request, at the expense of the MCO, an appeal to a neutral, exter-
nal body of appropriately licensed medical experts. 0 In addition, the
legislation reflected a widespread desire to make the process available
to emergency cases by establishing an expedited time line that pa-
tients could invoke, if necessary.8' To ensure the reviewers' independ-
a connection with ERISA plans."' Id. at 1254-55 (quoting Corporate Health Ins., 12 F.
Supp. 2d at 625). The result in Corporate Health Insurance thus placed in jeopardy all
state laws instituting independent review of MCO medical necessity decisionmaking,
and underscored the importance of federal action granting MCO enrollees the right
to an external appeal, which would, by definition, not be subject to possible ERISA
preemption. Fears of widespread judicial action against state external appeals laws
were premature, however, because MCOs slowly began to accept external review as a
procedural protection that might even help bolster their rapidly slipping credibility in
the marketplace. See Rundle, supra note 59 (reporting that MCOs see external appeals
as "a way to improve their credibility-and possibly forestall malpractice suits"). Some
health plans started voluntarily instituting external appeal procedures. See Nancy Ann
Jeffrey, Aetna to Set Reviews for HMO Coverage Disputes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1999, at B6
(reporting that Aetna had instituted an external review process); Rundle, supra note 59
(reporting that the California Association of Health Plans had set up a voluntary inde-
pendent review process). Moreover, in a showing of how far MCOs had come in their
acceptance of the notion of external appeal, in the wake of the Corporate Health Insur-
ance decision, both the Texas-based MCOs and Texas state officials successfully peti-
tioned the court to leave the appeals process in place pending the appeal. See Shapiro,
supra note 52, at 27 (attributing the mutual decision of Texas MCOs and state officials
to continue the independent review process even after it was struck down to the "popu-
larity and success" of external reviews).
7 See sources cited supra note 14 (providing a comprehensive list of the state legis-
lative provisions explicating the authority of independent review organizations to re-
view MCOs' medical necessity decisionmaking).
S. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999).
78 H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999).
POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 56, at 1 (reviewing general principles for consumer
access to the external appeals process).
"' Id. at 20-25 (outlining the eligibility requirements).
81 Id. at 39-40 (reviewing various states' external review time lines).
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ence, provisions listing explicit disquaifying conflicts of interest be-
tween reviewers and the health plan were prevalent throughout the
legislation, and the drafters of the statutes made sure to keep MCOs
out of the reviewer selection process."'
As for the process itself, most external appeals laws provided for a
paper review of the patient's medical records and the insurer's written
adverse determination. Many laws also allowed the patient to request
a personal hearing accompanied by their treating physician or any
other representative they might require 3 The majority of the laws
made the ultimate determination binding, but also did not restrict any
fuiture judicial review of the particular decision the enrollee might
want to pursue.! Finally, the external appeals statutes tended to in-
clude general provisions protecting the confidentiality of patients,
limiting the liability of the reviewers except in cases of gross negli-
gence, and requiring the reporting of statistics describing the number
of appeals and their dispositions.
D. Conclusion
Features inherent in the traditional fee-for-service medical care re-
imbursement system led a new generation of cost-conscious health
care insurers-MCOs-to pioneer the use of prospective and concur-
rent utilization review and attempt to control expenditures by actively
limiting payment to "medically necessary" services. Patient advocates
and legal commentators were concerned that MCOs' utilization re-
views would reflect a bias toward cost-containment over true medical
need. In an effort to circumvent this hazard, they conceived of an
MCO enrollee's right to appeal adverse medical necessity determina-
tions to independent bodies. They envisioned independent review
organizations, armed with certain procedural and substantive safe-
guards, serving as neutral, third-party arbiters to disputed medical ne-
cessity claims. The efforts of patient advocates and legal commenta-
tors met with early success, as states passed legislation establishing
Z See id. at 26-27 (sketching the characteristics considered important in the selec-
tiujn of external reviewers).
Se id. at 35-36 (discussing general features of external review processes).
See id. at 43 (revieing the disagreement among the states as to whether to make
external rexiew decisions binding).
". Sre MOLLY STAUFFER, HEALTH PoLIcy TRACKING SERICE, CONSUMER GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES: INTERNAL AND INDEPENDENT APPEALS 2 (1999) [hereinafter CONSUMER
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES] (describing the specific features of the state laws instituting
independent appeals).
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independent review organizations with most of the recommended
procedural and substantive features.
A closer examination of the more recent state and federal exter-
nal appeals laws, however, reveals an established process different
from the patient advocates' original conception. Over a relatively
short period, the scope of discretion granted to the independent re-
view organizations changed, as more recent legislative efforts tilted
the balance of power in these bodies away from even-handed neutral-
ity and toward the MCO enrollees.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF STATE EXTERNAL APPEALS LAWS
The independent review organizations, statutorily authorized in
over thirty jurisdictions to review MCO medical necessity determina-
tions, originated under state laws to aid MCO enrollees with any gen-
eral grievances they might have against their MCO.s6 After first ap-
pearing in Rhode Island in 1992, 7 the state-supported right to
external review emerged on a widespread scale in 1996 and 1997.
However, independent review organizations were largely limited in
the scope of their authority over MCO decisionmaking 8 By 1998, an-
other group of states had enacted statutes authorizing independent
review organizations. Compared to the external appeals laws of their
predecessors, however, the second group of states granted enhanced
powers and rhetorical importance to the external appeals bodies."'
State independent review organizations' leverage over MCO deci-
sionmaking progressed further in 1999 and 2000 due to the prolifera-
tion of statutory provisions that put the burden of proof on MCOs and
even allowed independent reviewers to approve treatment plans that
were not strictly "medically necessary."4°
$ See infra Part II.A (analyzing the pertinent provisions of bills passed in Michigan
and Florida that enacted the nonspecific MCO grievance panels that served as the
predecessors to the current visions of independent review organizations).
"' See infra Part ILB (discussing Rhode Island's Health Care Services-Utilization Re-
view Act, the first statutorily enacted right to external review of MCO medical necessity
determinations).
88 See infra Part II.C (analyzing the provisions of state external appeals laws passed
in 1996 and 1997 and concluding that states established independent review organiza-
tions with a limited scope of review).
69 See infra Part II.D (reviewing the 1998 state external appeals laws and concluding
that, on the whole, these laws expanded the authority of independent review organiza-
tions at the expense of MCOs in the so-called "neutral" arbitration process).
See infra Part II.E (examining the most recent state external appeals lawrs and
noting many instances where state legislators utilized statutory tools to convert suppos-
edly neutral independent review organizations into patient advocating bodies in the
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A. The Statutory Progenitors of the External Appeals Movement
In 1978, Michigan lawmakers passed the first state law granting
MCO enrollees the right to take health plan grievances to an external
body."' The M'ichigan legislators established a health facilities and
agencies advisory commission within the department of health and
authorized the chairperson to create "task force 3," a commission
subdivision charged with revieuing enrollee "protest[s] or ap-
peal [s]."" According to section 333.21088 of the Michigan Code:
(1) A health maintenance organization shall establish and maintain rea-
sonable procedures for receiving, processing, and resolving enrollee
complaints as to the operations of the organization.
(2) An enrollee may file a grievance with task force 3 of the advisory
commission after having exhausted the [internal] procedures for resolu-
tion of enrollee grievances .... The advisory commission shall render a
determination as to the validity of the grievance and direct measures it
considers appropriate under the circumstances. 3
Michigan created the earliest incarnation of a body outside and
independent of MCOs to hear grievances from MCO enrollees. The
panel was not created solely to settle appeals for denials of health
benefits because its mandate of "receiving, processing, and resolving
enrollee complaints as to the operations of the organization" also en-
compassed nonmedical concerns, such as customer service issues and
outstanding bills."1
The Michigan legislators clearly did not foresee a large role for
"task force 3" in the health care of Michigan citizens. First, the statute
does not outline any procedural guidelines for taking appeals. ' Addi-
tionally, legislators did not vest "task force 3" with any significant
authority. They merely granted it the broad and nonspecific ability to
"render a determination as to the validity of the grievance.""'
Florida passed a similar measure in 1985-its Statewide Subscriber
Assistance Program-to create a panel to review all unresolved griev-
ances from enrollees in MCOsi' Like the Michigan initiative, Flor-
MCO benefit determination process).
" S, eMICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.21088 (West 1992) (outlining the procedures
for handling grievances and complaints regarding the operations of health plans).
Id. § 333.21013.
Id. § 333.21088.
Id l. § 333.21088(l).
Id. § 333.21013.
Id. § 333.21088(2).
', FLA. STAT. ch. 641.311 (1)(a) (1991).
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ida's "appeals body" was not an expert organization. In fact, it con-
sisted primarily of government bureaucrats who could "contract with a
medical director [of a health plan] and a primary care physi-
cian... [for] technical expertise" if necessary. Florida legislators es-
tablished it primarily to reduce red tape in filing complaints with the
government against health insurers.
B. Rhode Island's 1992 Health Care Services-Utilization Review Act:
The First Statute Granting MCO Enrollees the Right to External
Review of Medical Necessity Determinations
In 1992, Rhode Island instituted the first external independent
review body specifically for adverse benefit determinations. 9 Rhode
Island's Health Care Services-Utilization Review Act required that "the
review agent shall provide for an external appeal by an unrelated and
objective appeal agency. '" 10 Rhode Island legislators specifically
charged the "appeal agency" with reviewing adverse determinations of
medical benefits: "The external appeal review and decision shall be
based on the medical necessity for the care, treatment or service, and
the appropriateness of service delivery for which authorization has
been denied. .. In addition, Rhode Island legislators mandated that
only "neutral physicians or dentists shall be utilized to make" the
medical decisions.
10 2
Rhode Island legislators structured their state appeal agency with
most of the basic procedural protections enumerated by commenta-
tors, including independence of the reviewers from the health plan""
9' Id. ch. 641.311. In 1998, Florida legislators expanded their state's independent
review statute to serve a more active MCO oversight function. See FLA. STAT.
ch. 408.7056 (Supp. 2000) (detailing a wider range of procedural restrictions on the
external appeals process).
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.12 (1996) (laying down basic grievance and appeal
procedures for all private state health plans).
100 Id. § 23-17.12-10.
161 Id. § 23-17.12-10(b) (1). The Rhode Island legislature amended its independent
review provision in 1999 to read: "The external appeal review and decision shall be
based on the medical necessity for the health care or service, and the appropriateness of
service delivery for which authorization has been denied." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.12-
10(b) (1) (Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
10' R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.12-10(b)(2) (1996). The Rhode Island legislature
amended the restriction on the credentialing of the independent decisionmakers in
1999 to include "other practitioners" and restrict the specialty of those practitioners
chosen to "the same or similar general specialty as typically manages the health care
service." R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17.12-10(b) (2) (Supp. 1999).
"'3 R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17.12-10(b) (2) (1996) (explicitly providing for "neutral"
reviewers mutually agreed upon by the health plan and enrollee).
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and the power to make final determinations binding on MCOs.A
Rhode Island specifically authorized its appeal agency to monitor
MCO decisionmaking by analyzing the proposed care and making a
judgment as to its propriety.'' As a result, Rhode Island's Health Care
Services-Utilization Review Act was the first statutorily enacted model
of the external independent review agency originally envisioned by
legal commentators and patient advocates."
C. External Review Organizations Emerge on a Wider Scale:
The Early State External Appeals Processes
It was not until 1996 and 1997 that other states created external
review boards to oversee MCO medical necessity determinations."7
The pertinent provisions in this wave of post-Rhode Island statutes re-
veal that the state legislators envisioned a generally limited role for
the medical necessity review boards.
Three states-Vermont, Ohio, and California-established exter-
nal review procedures but expressly restricted their scope to certain
specialized areas of decisionmaking. California in 1996'" and Ohio in
1997' mandated that MCOs give enrollees the right to appeal cover-
age denials to expedited independent review, but only in cases involv-
ing experimental or investigational therapies. California's and Ohio's
provisions also limited eligibility for appeal of adverse benefit deci-
sions to patients with a terminal condition and a life expectancy of
under two years for whom standard therapies were not effective.""
Thus, the laws excluded pure medical necessity determinations from
the scope of the review board's authority. Vermont's 1997 statute
"" Id. § 23-17.12-10(b) (5) (providing aggrieved enrollees the right to further judi-
cial review of the decision).
Id. § 2'-17.12-10(b) (1) (stating the bases for external appeal review).
See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text (outlining the basic substantive
and procedural requirements that legal commentators and other patient advocates
considered crucial to the establishment of an equitable external appeals process).
'" See CONSUMER GRIEnANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 85, at 5-18 (reviewing the
legislative efforts of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Vermont).
"" CxL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4 (West Supp. 2000) (providing for an ex-
ternal review process for health plan decisions regarding experimental or investiga-
tional therapies).
J- OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1753.24 (Anderson Supp. 1999) (establishing an ex-
ternal appeals process for coverage decisions relating to MCO enrollees with a termi-
nal condition who are no longer responding to standard therapies).
", See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4(a) (West Supp. 2000) (setting
eligibility criteria for the review process).
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similarly restricted the scope of its independent review panel, author-
izing it to deal solely with mental health-related coverage decisions."
Of the states that passed comprehensive legislation, most confined
the board's decisionmaking discretion. Arizona's 1997 Health Care
Appeals Act noted: "For cases involving an issue of medical necessity,
the independent reviewer or reviewers shall evaluate and analyze the
case and render a decision that is based upon the utilization review plan
on whether or not the service or claim for the service is medically nec-
essary." 2 With this language, the Arizona legislature limited inde-
pendent reviewers to analyzing the course of action that the MCO-or
its utilization review agent-ordered, rather than asking reviewers to
undertake their own evaluation of the situation at hand. Likewise,
Missouri's 1997 statute charged independent review organizations
with making a "decision as to the resolution of the grievance ... based
upon a review of the written record before it."' 5 As in Arizona, Mis-
souri legislators circumscribed reviewers' independence; instead of
having the appeals board reach its own conclusion, Missouri's statute
merely requested a third party review of the propriety of the adverse
benefit determination.
The statutes' rhetorical language also reflected the restricted
scope of these early external review boards. North Carolina's law
called for the independent panel to make a "recommendation" to the
insurer. 14 Texas's law instituted a "complaint appeal panel, which
[advised] the health maintenance organization on the resolution of
the dispute."" 5 Neither statute envisioned an appeals panel doing
anything more than acting as an adjunct to the MCO decisionmaking
process.
As time progressed, state laws expanded reviewers' actual and rhe-
torical authority. States began vesting appeals panels with more inde-
pendence in their decisionmaking abilities and with tools by which to
overturn MCO adverse benefit determinations.
... VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089a (Supp. 2000) (providing for external appeals for
health plan coverage decisions regarding mental health care services).
P2 ARiZ. REv. STAT. § 20-2537(F) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1387(1) (Supp. 1999).
114 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62(h) (3) (1999).
"' TEX. INS. CODEANN. § 20A.12(i) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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D. The Second Wave of External Appeals Laws: Creating a MAore
Independent External Review Process
In 1998, eight more states and the District of Columbia passed ex-
ternal appeals legislation creating independent review organiza-
tions."'" This second collection of legislative efforts revealed a distinct
progression both in the language used to describe the external ap-
peals process and in the substantive powers granted to the independ-
ent review organizations. Slowly, independent review organizations
evolved from neutral, expert bodies into patient advocates with the
authority to participate actively in the MCO benefit determination
process.
The District of Columbia's Health Benefits Plan Members Bill of
Rights Act of 1998 created independent review bodies and outlined
their authority by noting: "Upon acceptance of the appeal for proc-
essing, the independent review organization shall conduct a full re-
view to determine whether, as a result of the insurer's decision, the
member was deprived of any service covered by the health benefits
plan.""7 Both the emphasis on MCOs' "deprivation" of health care
services and the novel, critical attitude attributed to the independent
review organization are significant. No longer was independent re-
view intended to provide a passive, neutral justification or negation of
MCO practices, but rather reviewers had been assigned the mission of
conducting a "full review" of MCOs' decisions.
This language facilitated the emergence of a courtroom-style ad-
versarial relationship between the independent external review body
and the MCO. Maryland's 1998 updating of its health insurance legis-
lation echoed that tone."" The Maryland legislature specifically allo-
cated the burden of persuasion in all appeals, charging: "During the
review of a complaint... a carrier shall have the burden of persuasion
that its adverse decision or grievance decision, as applicable, is cor-
rect."" The Maryland legislature thus shifted the external review
process away from a neutral inquiry and explicitly placed the MCO
decisionmakers on the defensive.
During this second major wave of independent review organiza-
"" See CONSUMER GRIEvuNCE PROCEDURES, supra note 85, at 5-19 (summarizing
bills passed in 1998 in Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland,
New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-571.7(h) (Supp. 2000).
Sc, MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-IOA-02 (Supp. 2000) (delineating the complaint
process for adverse MCO decisions or enrollee grievances).
". Id. § 15-1OA-03(e) (1).
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don legislation in 1998, states also gave the reviewers more tools to use
in the adversarial process. The District of Columbia, for example,
listed the sources to which independent reviewers by law must turn in
order to find support for a proposed health care service previously
denied by an MCO:
In reaching a determination, the independent review organization
shall take into consideration all pertinent medical records, consulting phy-
sician reports, and other documents submitted by the parties, any appli-
cable generally accepted practice guidelines developed by the federal
government, national or professional medical societies, boards and asso-
ciations, any applicable clinical protocols or practice guidelines devel-
oped by the insurer, and may consult with such other professionals as
appropriate and necessary.
Through the provision, which specifically required the independent
review board to make use of certain resources, the legislature afforded
the reviewers a great deal of leeway in finding a basis to overturn an
adverse determination.
Other state laws integrated similar measures to give their external
reviewers more discretion in finding erroneous MCO decisions re-
garding disputed physicians' treatment plans. The New York legisla-
ture's 1998 formulation of its independent review law instructed the
external appeals agent to "review the utilization review agent's final
adverse determination and ... make a determination as to whether
the health care plan acted reasonably and with sound medical judg-
ment and in the best interest of the patient.''. As a result, the inde-
pendent reviewer could overturn MCO determinations on the basis of
three different categories-reasonable action, "sound medical judg-
ment," and the patient's "best interest"-rather than simply consider-
ing whether the care was medically necessary.11
2
E. The Third Wave of State Legislation: Pushing the Envelope on the
Discretion and Authority of External Review Boards
In 1999 and 2000, the trend toward granting the right of external
appeal for adverse MCO medical necessity determinations continued,
as at least eleven states enacted new laws setting up independent re-
view organizations, 123 and California and Ohio expanded the previ-
120 SeeD.G. CODEANN. § 32-571.7(0) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
'2' N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914(b) (4) (A) (Consol. Supp. 1999).
122 Id.
123 See CONSUMER GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 85, at 5-19 (giving an over-
view of state requirements for external appeals laws passed in 1999 by Colorado, Geor-
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ously restricted discretion of the boards in their states to include
medical necessity determinations.' Generally, the legislative provi-
sions built on their statutory progenitors, augmenting external re-
viewers' rhetorical independence as well as their actual authority to
overturn adverse MCO benefit determinations.
Stronger language gave the independent review the rhetorical
authority of an actual court adjudication. When Iowa amended its
statutory insurance regulations governing MCOs in 1999 to include an
external appeal system, it included an entire section devoted to inde-
pendent reviewers' "standard of review" for making their determina-
tions, noting: "Review by the independent review entity is de novo."1
2 5
Hawaii's independent appeals provision, also passed in 1999, even al-
lowed the independent reviewer to award "attorney's fees and reason-
able costs of a suit" to a patient bringing an appeal. 2 ' Clearly, Hawai-
ian legislators wanted the independent reviewers to consider
themselves akin to a court of law.
More states also explicitly listed the sources reviewers should use
in investigating the propriety of an MCO's adverse determination."'
The California legislature even expanded the range of the sources:
Following its review, the reviewer or reviewers shall determine whether
the disputed health care service was medically necessary based on the
specific medical needs of the enrollee and any of the following:
(1) Peer-reviewed scientific and medical evidence regarding the effec-
tiveness of the disputed service.
(2) Nationally recognized professional standards.
(3) Expert opinion.
(4) Generally accepted standards of medical practice.
(5) Treatments that are likely to provide a benefit to a patient for condi-
tions for which other treatments are not clinically efficacious. 
2
8
gia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, and
Virginia).
SU GeCL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30 (West Supp. 1999), amended by 2000
Cal. Legis. Serv. AB. 2903 (West) (expanding the eligibility for external review to all
adverse MCO determinations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1753.24 (Anderson Supp.
1999) (same). Vermont had previously expanded its independent review program in
1998. S,,VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089f (Supp. 2000).
IOWA CODE § 514J.12 (Supp. 1999).
HAW. REX. STAT. § 432E-6(a) (6) (d) (Supp. 1999).
S,, e.g., L. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:3082 (West Supp. 2000) (delineating factors
the external reviewers may consider in making their independent determinations).
"CX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.33 (West Supp. 2000).
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In augmenting the sources of available evidence beyond national
standards and clinical practice guidelines, the California law included
two very subjective categories-" [g] enerally accepted standards" and
"[lt]reatments that are likely to provide a benefit."2 ' As indicated in
Part II, MCOs became popular in part by cutting costs through stan-
dardizing variances in medical practice that did not affect different
patient populations' health care.""° Yet, California appealed to the
vague notion of "generally accepted" practices in evaluating MCOs'
attempts to deny a medical service as medically unnecessary. In addi-
tion, asking the independent reviewers to determine if a treatment
was "likely to provide a benefit" required the reviewers to undertake a
case-specific analysis of a proposed health service. Instead of encour-
aging neutrality and independence on the part of the external appeal
agents, California legislators seemed to search for alternatives by
which to allow the agents to overturn an MCO denial.
As a symbolic final step, Illinois's amendments to its Health Main-
tenance Organization Act instituted an external independent review
program, authorizing the reviewer to "render a decision that is based
on whether or not the health care service or claim for the health care
service is medically appropriate.""3' That the statute omitted all mention
of "necessity" is ironic because patients' advocates originally conceived
of independent reviewers as neutral third-party arbiters of MCO
medical necessity determinations.
F. Conclusion
Within a relatively short time frame, a number of states estab-
lished a right to external appeal of adverse MCO medical necessity de-
terminations and instituted external review boards to mediate those
appeals. With each passing year, states developed increasingly inter-
ventionist tactics to place the reviewers at odds with MCOs and con-
comitantly to enhance reviewers' ability to overturn adverse MCO de-
terminations. Eventually, independent review organizations evolved
from neutral, third-party expert arbiters into powerful institutional pa-
tient advocates that aggrieved MCO enrollees could enlist to help
them by finding their physician-recommended treatment plans
"medically necessary" under the terms of their MCO contracts.
129 id.
" See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 18-21 (discussing the variations in
health care provider practices).
... 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 134/45 (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
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Part III investigates how the legislative history of the federal bills
granting the right of external appeal mirrored that evolution.
III. NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS AT ESTABLISHING
INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL REVIEW BoARDs
The road to the passage of national legislation granting MCO en-
rollees the right to external appeal of MCO medical necessity deter-
minations-the Senate Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999... and
the House of Representatives Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care
Improvement Act of 19991---followed a similar course. The early leg-
islative efforts of 1997 tended to follow patient advocates' and legal
commentators' visions of a neutral, third-party arbiter and enumer-
ated independent review organizations with restricted authority.
134
Over the next two years, however, legislators drafted bills envisioning
an activist independent review organization with the authority and
sanction to intercede in MCO decisionmaking. The inclination to
favor an independent review organization that implicitly and explicitly
favored patients over MCOs culminated with the passage of the Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999 63 and the Bipartisan Consensus
Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999." 7
A. Setting the Scene: Pfior National Attempts To Pass "Patients'Rights"
Legislation and the Legislative History of the 1999 Bills
In 1997, as independent external appeal agencies were growing in
popularity at the state level, Representative John D. Dingell and Sena-
S. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999).
SH.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999).
St n~fia Part III.A (discussing the justifications for and pertinent provisions of
the Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, the first federal legislative attempt to
establish a national right to external review of MCO medical necessity determinations).
SSriifa Part IIIA (reviewing changes in legislative visions subsequent to the
Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, which increasingly promoted activist inde-
pendent review boards).
I Se inifra Part III.B (analyzing the external appeals provisions of the Senate Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights Plus Act and finding that the independent review organization
created by the bill had unprecedented authority over MCOs and over the resources
with which to critique MCO medical necessity determinations).
"7 So, ifa Part III.C (analyzing the external appeals provisions of the House of
Representatives Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 and
finding that the House of Representatives endeavored to establish an independent re-
view organization with sufficient procedural and substantive power to intervene ac-
tively in MCO medical necessity determinations).
20011
902 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:873
tor Edward G. Kennedy concurrently introduced into the United
States House of Representatives and Senate the first patients' rights
legislation, the Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997."" In pre-
senting the bill, Dingell echoed the widely held conviction that the
managed care system had evolved to the point where financial con-
cerns overshadowed patient care. He noted: "We've gone from cost
being no consideration to cost being the only consideration in provid-
ing health care .... According to surveys, [eighty] percent of Ameri-
can people agree that quality care is often compromised to save
money. ", 39 He proposed to improve MCOs' perceived overemphasis
on cost-containment by creating "an appeals process that works." 4 "
Such an appeals process would include "a real, fair, dispute resolution
process which takes account of the views of the patient and provider as
well as a third party... who can look at the situation from a new per-
spective.
1 41
The bill set down two different categories of appealable events:
denial of coverage for "[e]xperimental [t]reatment[s]"',4 and a resid-
ual classification for denial of "claim[s] for benefits involving costs
over a significant threshold, or assuring access to care for a serious
condition." 43 Thus, akin to some early state legislative efforts, the
Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997 did not apply to all catego-
ries of medical necessity coverage denials. 4 4 In addition, the bill did
not specify the external independent reviewers' role in reviewing
claims, and granted no special discretion or weight to its reviewing
process. The first incarnation of an external review process was ulti-
mately characterized by both the cautious rhetoric surrounding its es-
tablishment-Dingell's remarks to the House emphasized "look[ing]
at the situation from a new perspective"' 4 -- and the limited authority
granted to it.
The 1997 bill did not receive enough votes to pass out of commit-
tee, so the next year Dingell again brought the issue of patient protec-
tion under managed care to the floor of the House with the Patients'
"" H.R. 820, 105th Cong. (1997).
139 143 CONG. REc. E313 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1997) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
140 Id.
141 id.
142 H.R. 820, 105th Cong. § 2785(E) (1997).
"4 Id. § 2785(F) (2) (A)-(B).
'4' See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089d (Supp. 2000) (establishing an external
appeals process for MCO decisionmaking regarding only mental health).
1 143 Cong. Rec. E313, supra note 139.
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Bill of Rights Act of 1998."6 Dingell's 1998 bill revealed an increas-
ingly aggressive vision of independent review organizations."' The
rhetoric was more inflammatory, as the provision allowing appeals in
order to "assur[e] access to care for a serious condition" was changed
to allow appeals when "the patient's life or health is jeopardized as a
consequence of the decision."'' s The bill also imported legal termi-
nology, requiring that the external appeal process "provide for a fair,
de novo determination." 9
At the same time, a number of competing legislative initiatives
arose that also provided for external review of MCO adverse medical
necessity determinations. '" Representative Benjamin L. Cardin intro-
duced the Patient Right to Independent Appeal Act of 1998,'5' with
the hope of providing "immediate access to needed health services"
and "reestablish [ing] the primacy of doctor-patient decisions."' " Car-
din's Patient Right to Independent Appeal Act of 1998 proposed
granting the independent external review entity the explicit power to
review MCO medical necessity determinations. '5 On the Senate side,
a small bipartisan group of senators introduced the Promoting Re-
sponsible Managed Care Act of 1998,'5 a bill that expressly allowed
many considerations to serve as "[a] dmissible evidence"' during in-
dependent reviews, including "personal health and medical informa-
tion," "the opinion of the individual's treating physician," and:
"" H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998). Senator Tom Daschle joined Dingell on the
Senate side. S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1998).
" Se H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 133(a) (2) (1998) (defining more broadly the cri-
teria for appealability).
Id. § 133(a) (2) (B).
' Id. § 133 (b) (2) (A).
Notably, in 1997, provisions establishing independent external review boards
were not as common. For example, the Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997
set out guidelines for MCO internal appeal procedures but did not explicitly mandate
outside re.iew. S'e H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. § 2776(b) (1997) (describing the due pro-
cess safeguards for MCO enrollees in their internal appeals process). In the end, none
of these competing health care reform bills passed in 1997.
" H.R. 3469, 105th Cong. (1998).
Hafth Care Qualit ': Grievance Procedures: Hearing of Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Rs., 105th Cong. 134 (1998) [hereinafter Grievance Procedures] (statement of
Rep. Cardin).
H.R. 3469, 105th Cong. § 2706(a) (2) (B) (1998).
S. 2416, 105th Cong. (1998).
Id. § 106(b) (3). The use of the term "admissible evidence" is another example
of legislators' importation of adjudicatory-and thus inherently adversarial-termi-
nology into the independent appeals process.
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The results of studies that meet professionally recognized standards of
validity and replicability or that have been published in peer-reviewed
journals.
The results of professional consensus conferences conducted or fi-
nanced in whole or in part by one or more government agencies.
Practice and treatment guidelines prepared or financed in whole or in
part by government agencies.
Government-issued coverage and treatment policies.
To the extent that the entity determines it to be free of any conflict of
interest-
(i) the opinions of individuals who are qualified as experts in one or
more fields of health care which are directly related to the matters under
appeal, and
(ii) the results of peer reviews conducted by the plan or issuer in-
volved. -6
Thus, as provisions listing the sources upon which independent
reviewers could base their decisions grew in popularity in the states,
these same provisions also surfaced in federal legislative efforts.
No patient protection bill made it through both chambers of
Congress in 1998. In the 106th Congress, however, a combination of
past failures and ever-increasing popular demand primed legislators
from across the political spectrum to reconsider patient protection
legislation. The bills promulgated by the Senate and House envi-
sioned a powerful, independent appeals agency with the discretion
and the numerous resources to monitor and overturn adverse MCO
benefit determinations.
B. The Senate Patients'Bill of Rights Plus Act
On July 15, 1999, the Senate passed the Patients' Bill of Rights
Plus Act.'57 Though the bill notably omitted the much-debated right
to sue health insurance plans,'58 senators hailed the external inde-
pendent appeals process as "the lynchpin of any successful consumer
Id. § 106(b) (3) (A)-(E).
157 S. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999).
See Alison Mitchell, Senate Approves Republican Plan for Health Care N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 1999, at Al (noting President Clinton's threatened veto of the bill because it
lacked the right to sue). See generally Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and
Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419 (1997) (describing different wa)s
to hold MCOs legally responsible for patient injuries resulting from their coverage de-
terminations).
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protection effort"' ' for its ability to "get patients' claims decided when
the patient needs the care."""
The Act authorized the external review board to "make an inde-
pendent determination based on the valid, relevant, scientific and
clinical evidence to determine the medical necessity, appropriateness,
experimental or investigational nature of the proposed treatment.""'
It required the independent reviewers, in making their determination,
to "take into consideration appropriate and available information."' 2
The bill then defined such information to include the MCOs' clinical
practice guidelines, the medical record and other information submit-
ted by patients and their health care providers, "expert consensus in-
cluding both generally accepted medical practice and recognized best
practice," medical literature, standard reference compendia, 163 and
findings from studies conducted under the auspices of federal agen-
cies, federally recognized research institutions,'" or national boards
that evaluate "the medical value of health services."' 6-
The Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999 thus incorporated the
more progressive elements of earlier patient protection legislation
into its final conception of the external review process. It covered ap-
peals of any medical necessity determinations and included express
reference to medical "appropriateness" as an alternative standard to
"necessity.""' It mandated an "independent" determination on the
evidence, unbound by any plan definition of "medical necessity.
",6
Finally, it provided an extensive list of resources that the reviewers had
to take into consideration when ruling on a particular prescribed
health serice.'' " Yet, the resource list elaborated further on the ear-
145 CONG. REC. S8559 (daily ed.July 15, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Enzi).
Id. at S8541 (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
DO Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, S. 1344, 106th Cong. § 503 (e) (4) (A) (i) (1999).
Mh. § 503(e) (4) (A) (ii).
Id. The Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act explicitly names the appropriate com-
pendia: "The American Hospital Formulary Service-Drug Information, the American
Dental Association Accepted Dental Therapeutics, and the United States Pharmaco-
poeia-Drug Information." Id.
11- The Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act lists some representative institutes: "The
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, National Institutes of Health, National
Academy of Sciences, Health Care Financing Administration." Id.
Id.
Id. § 503(e) (4) (A) (i).
1, d.
- See id. § 503(e)(4)(A)(ii) (naming an array of reference compendia and re-
search institutes where the independent reviewers could look to find support for a par-
ticular disputed health service).
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lier legislation by including, for example, "generally accepted medical
practice,"' 69 a quasi-subjective category that recognizes health care
providers' regular reliance on time-honored care modalities whose ef-
ficacy has not yet been proven by evidence-based criteria.
In the end, the Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999 formulated
an external review procedure that granted a large measure of deci-
sionmaking autonomy to its independent reviewers. On a procedural
level, independent reviewers, under the bill's provisions, were not re-
quired to consider the MCO's express rationales for each particular
adverse decision. Whereas previous federal legislative efforts em-
powered reviewers to decide "whether such decision[s] w[ere] in ac-
cordance with the terms of the plan,"'7' the Patients' Bill of Rights Plus
Act of 1999 omitted consideration of MCOs' prior decisionmaking
and deemed the reviewers' decision to be free of any implicitly suspect
MCO analysis. In addition to this procedural autonomy, the Senate
delineated a comprehensive list of resources that reviewers must can-
vass in making their substantive determinations.17 By including quasi-
subjective elements and instructing the independent reviewers to
judge the medical "appropriateness" of a proposed health treatment
plan in addition to its "necessity,"7 ' the Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act
of 1999 lowered the standard for upholding a particular health service
below purely evidence-based necessity. Thus, from a procedural and
substantive point of view, Senate legislators armed the independent
review process with the authority to cast a critical eye-more than an
independent one-on MCO adverse medical necessity determina-
tions.
C. The House of Representatives Bipartisan Consensus Managed
Care Improvement Act of 1999
A few months later, the House advanced its patient protection leg-
islation. Rather than using the Senate blueprint, the House formu-
lated the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of
169 Id.
,70 See id. § 503(e) (4) (A) (i) (setting forth the standard for independent reviewers
but notably omitting reference to prior MCO determinations).
171 H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. § 1201(b) (4) (C) (i) (1998).
172 Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, S. 1344, 106th Cong. § 503(e) (4) (A) (ii) (1999)
(listing clinical standards and informational resources that must be taken into ac-
count).
173 Id. § 503(e) (4) (A) (i).
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1999."' Though it differed from the Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of
1999 on such aspects as the right to sue health plans, the Bipartisan
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 outlined an ex-
ternal review process with similar interventionist features and respon-
sibilities."'
First, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act
of 1999 established that the external appeal procedure "shall provide
for a fair, de novo determination. ' m  It granted reviewers the ability to
"determine whether the plan's or issuer's decision is in accordance
uith the medical needs of the patient involved." 77 The bill, however,
quickly discounted the importance of the "plan's or issuer's decision"
by noting in the very next clause: "In making such determination, the
external appeal entity shall consider (but not be bound by) any lan-
guage in the plan or coverage document relating to the definitions of
the telms medical necessity, medically necessary or appropriate, or
experimental, investigational, or related terms.,,17 8
On a substantive level, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care
Improvement Act of 1999 took care to spell out the "evidence", 71 on
which the independent reviewers are to rely in making their determi-
nations. It divided such evidence into two categories: resources that
the independent review organization must take into consideration-
the basis of the health plan's adverse determination, "personal health
and medical information supplied with respect to" the patient, and
the opinion of the patient's health care professional -and resources
that the independent review organization may take into consideration
if applicable.""' In the latter category, the Bipartisan Consensus Man-
aged Care Improvement Act of 1999 included the quasi-subjective
"[ciommunity standard of care and generally accepted principles of
medical practice" as well as the opinions of experts in the specific
medical field at issue and results of "peer reviews conducted by the
plan or issuer involved" to the extent that they are "free of any conflict
of interest."'
H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999).
See id. § 103 (outlining the external appeals process).
Id. § 103(b) (2) (A).
I d. § 103 (b) (2) (B).
" Id. § 103(b) (2) ().
Id. § 103(b)(2)(D).
Id. § 103(b) (2) (D) (i)
Id. § 103(b) (2) (D) (ii)(I)-(VII).
Id. § 103(b) (2) (D) (ii),)-(VII).
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Therefore, from both a procedural and substantive point of view,
the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999
built upon the earlier incarnations of federal patient protection legis-
lation. Mandating the "de novo" feature of the reviewers' work reiter-
ated the adversarial language increasingly associated with the inde-
pendent appeals process's consideration of the health plan's
decision.'83 While the decision of the MCO played a more prominent
role in the language of the House bill than in the Senate version,
House legislators nevertheless made explicit efforts to ensure that the
independent reviewers were "not bound by" any decisions the health
plan made or by provisions, such as definitions of "medically neces-
sary," found in the health insurance contract. 4 Finally, the Bipartisan
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 listed resources
that, while surrounded by less imperious rhetoric, included quasi-
subjective aspects such as general medical standards and opinions of
experts on the topic that may not have been exposed to the scientific
rigors of peer review. 85
What are the practical consequences of the House bill's enabling
provisions? Representative J. Greg Ganske envisioned an activist in-
dependent appeals process coming to the aid of enrollees whose
MCOs limited their medical treatment options:
[I]f at the end of their utilization review or their internal appeal within
their plan and the plan is still saying, no, we are not going to give you
this care and everything you have read about it and your own physician is
telling you this is prevailing standards of care and you can be harmed
without it, then an individual ought to have access to an external, inde-
pendent body with the capability and authoriq, to resolve disputes for
cases involving medical judgment by the plan.
The provision that the independent reviewers may take into con-
sideration "results of peer reviews conducted by the plan or issuer in-
volved" only if they were "free of any conflict of interest" 87-implying
that scientific studies conducted by health plans are inherently sus-
pect-further demonstrated the legislators' critical attitude toward the
"83 See id. § 103(b) (2) (A) (mandating that the process shall provide "for a fair, de
novo determination").
, Id. § 103(b) (2) (C).
See id. § 103(b)(2)(D)(i)-(ii) (listing both mandatory and optional resources
that independent reviewers take into consideration during their analysis of MCO deci-
sionmaking).
"6 145 CONG. REC. H8952 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1999) (statement of Rep. Ganske).
1,7 Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723,
106th Cong. § 103(b) (2) (D) (ii) (VII) (1999).
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MCO medical necessity determinations. The "de novo" standard of
review' enabled the independent reviewers to provide a critical look
at the appealed situation, rather than being limited by the health
plan's decision. In the end, the House Bipartisan Consensus Man-
aged Care Improvement Act of 1999, like the Senate Patients' Bill of
Rights Plus Act of 1999 before it, endeavored to set up an external
appeals process with sharply demarcated autonomy and real authority
to make its own determinations on disputed medical necessity is-
sues.
D. Conclusion
The progression of patient protection legislative efforts at the fed-
eral level, leading to the ultimate passage of two bills instituting pa-
tients' rights to independent external appeals of adverse MCO benefit
determinations, in many ways corresponded to the statutory develop-
ment seen at the state level. In Congress, as in the states, legislators
vested the independent reviewers with greater discretion in their deci-
sionmaking by increasing their autonomy and expanding the re-
sources available to them. Thus, over time, the predominant vision of
the independent review process moved from a neutral, third-party ar-
Id. § 103(b)(2)(A).
Due to differences between the Senate and House bills unrelated to the inde-
pendent appeals provisions, no patient protection legislation made it to the President's
desk by the end of the 106th Congress. In the summer of 2000, the House Bipartisan
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 came to the floor of the Senate,
but it lost by a vote of 51-48. Major Garrett, Clinton Urges Congress to Pass Patients'Bill of
Rigkts Af"t Supreme Court Ruling (June 13, 2000) (describing the failure of the House-
passed patients' rights bill in the Senate), http://,v.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/
stories/06/13/clinton.hmos. Senate Republicans made some concessions on issues
such as bringing suit against MCOs and the extent of the coverage of the Act and at-
tached a "Patients' Bill of Rights" to a standard appropriations bill. Departments of
Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2001, H.R. 4577, 106th Cong. tit. XXII (2000). While this Appropriations Act
passed, staunch opposition to the patients' rights provision in the House ultimately led
to the demise of that section. See Bash, supra note 2 (noting that aides to the sponsor-
ing Senate Republican "acknowledge[d] they lack[ed] support in the House for this
measure"). The section of the Act establishing the independent review process was
consistent with the earlier Senate Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act and House Bipartisan
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 in its broad implicit and explicit
grant of authority to independent reviewers to overturn MCO decisionmaking. See
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2001, H.R. 4577, 106th Cong. tit. XXII, § 503B(d) (3) (E) (2000)
(mandating, inter alia, that the independent reviewers determine medical necessity
without regard for the MCO definitions of medical necessity, unless such definitions
comport with those established by state or federal governmental bodies).
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biter with limited scope to an advocate for MCO enrollees attempting
to obtain authorization for health services disputed by the MCO as not
"medically necessary." The next Part analyzes the significance of the
legislative evolution of external appeals laws and what that evolution
suggests regarding legislators' conception of the role of the inde-
pendent appeals process in the modern medical marketplace.
IV. THE NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTERNAL APPEALS PROCESS
As Parts II and III indicate, the construction of legislation enact-
ing external, independent appeals boards charged with reviewing
MCOs' medical necessity determinations changed over time. Legisla-
tors directly increased the authority of independent review organiza-
tions by divorcing reviewers' analysis from MCOs' decisionmaking
processes, diminishing the standard of necessity for the disputed serv-
ices, and expanding the range of sources on which reviewers could
justify their determinations. Legislators also indirectly shifted the bal-
ance of power in appeals from MCO decisionmakers to independent
reviewers through various rhetorical devices, including envisioning
the independent review process as an adjudicatory forum in which
health plans must defend their adverse determinations. This Part
suggests the legislators' possible motivations, with respect to the re-
markable evolution of external appeals laws, and analyzes whether
progressively expanding the authority of independent reviewers vis-;!-
vis MCO utilization review decisionmaking is likely to achieve legisla-
tors' goals.
A. Interpreting the Legislative Construction of Mare Activist
Independent Review Organizations
On one level, constructing external appeals laws that grant exter-
nal reviewers enhanced decisionmaking authority represents the in-
troduction of another incremental safeguard for MCO enrollees in
the appeals process. After all, some of the more recent external ap-
peals laws contain more stringent procedural protections than were
characteristic of earlier versions, such as listing qualification criteria
for the independent experts'"0 and certain specifically prohibited con-
'" See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-39(a) (1) (A)-(C) (2000) (requiring external
reviewers, at a minimum, to be experts in the treatment of the medical condition at
issue, hold nonrestricted licenses, and have no history of disciplinary action).
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flicts of interest.1" In addition, Professor Kinney, among others, con-
sidered granting reviewers enough discretion to make the appropriate
detennination one of the key procedural elements in a successful ap-
peals process." ' Therefore, one can interpret provisions expanding
the scope of independent reviewer decisionmaking authority as a
means of protecting enrollee interests in the external appeals process
by ensuring that the reviewers are acting as more than just rubber
stamps for MCO decisionmaking.
Interpreting legislatively sanctioned expansions of the authority of
independent reviewers as merely another consumer protection, how-
ever, underestimates the rhetorical significance that legal commenta-
tors and legislators have placed on the external appeals process. Rep-
resentative Cardin, in his remarks supporting the Patient Right to
Independent Appeal Act of 1998'9' before the Senate Labor and Hu-
man Resources Committee, said, "[W] hat patients want most is imme-
diate access to needed health services... [and o]nly an external ap-
peals process can provide this access.""' The exaggerated import
man), patient advocates bestowed on these legislative efforts suggests a
more fundamental characterization of the expanding control of ex-
ternal reviewers over MCO medical necessity decisionmaking. Rather
than merely supporting aggrieved MCO enrollees' rights, legislators
may be empowering external reviewers at the expense of MCO deci-
sionmaking as a proxy for returning the American health care mar-
ketplace to the traditional decisionmaking paradigm.
As noted in Part I, under the traditional health care reimburse-
ment system, the indemnity insurers tended not to interfere with phy-
sicians' provision of medical services.', Instead, physicians controlled
the prescription of health services-and thus set the standard for
"medically necessary" services-through their ethical obligations to
their patients not to prescribe improper or unnecessary treatments. 96
"" See, e.g., id. § 33-20A-39(b) (listing entities to which reviewers cannot have "any
material professional, familial, or financial conflict of interest").
"' Supra text accompanying note 69 (setting down Professor Kinney's four key
procedural elements to a fair independent review process).
H.R. 3469, 105th Cong. (1998).
Grievance Procedures, supra note 152, at 134.
1. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (describing the peripheral place of
indemnity insurers in the traditional fee-for-service design of the health care reim-
bursement system).
11- See DENNIS A. ROBBINS, INTEGRATING MANAGED GW.RE AND ETHICS:
TRNSFORMING CHALLENGES INTO POSITrVE OUTCOMES 11-13 (1998) (describing the
changes in providers' ethical responsibilities arising from the differences between fee-
for-service and managed care health care delivery systems).
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With the movement to managed care, however, MCO health plan con-
tracts limited physician reimbursement to "medically necessary" serv-
ices and, through tools such as prospective and concurrent utilization
review, health plans more actively enforced the contractual limita-
tions.' 9' Exerting control over physician prescription practices made
MCOs the new arbiters of medical necessity, as their own internal
standards supplanted the medical decisionmaking of the treating phy-
sicians. In essence, under managed care, physicians judged what
was medically necessary for their patients and then submitted their de-
terminations to the utilization reviewers at the patients' MCOs. After
the MCOs conducted their utilization reviews, they either agreed with
the treating physicians, or in the case of adverse benefit determina-
tions, rejected the physicians' judgments of medical necessity and re-
placed them with their own.
Patient advocates originally conceived of the external appeals pro-
cess to ensure that financial incentives to limit the provision of medi-
cal services would not lead MCOs improperly to deny medically neces-
sary care. In granting ever-widening discretion and making more
resources available to the external reviewers, however, legislators
made it increasingly difficult for MCOs to maintain their own defini-
tions of what is "medically necessary." To understand this change, it is
important to realize that the external appeals entity only reviews deci-
sions where the MCO medical necessity standard is more limited than
that of the treating physician. That is, when a particular treatment
modality is available to a patient, the physician either can: (a) deter-
mine that the service is not medically necessary and not offer it to the
patient; or (b) prescribe the service. In fee-for-service health care, the
decisionmaking process ends at this point. Under managed care,
however, the health plan then reviews only the services prescribed &y the
physician, and either can: (a) authorize the prescribed service; or (b)
deny it. If the MCO authorizes the service, there is no debate, be-
cause the physician and health plan agree on the medical necessity of
the treatment, and the physician's recommendation is implemented,
just as it would be under fee-for-service decisionmaking.
While authorizations pass unchecked, patient advocates have suc-
cessfully lobbied legislators to grant patients the right to appeal health
'97 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 6, at 1651-54 (discussing the insurers' use of
prospective utilization review to determine the proper medical treatment).
9' See Peter R. Kongstvedt, Elements of Management Control and Governance Structure,
in ESSENTALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 75 (describing the role of
the utilization review committee).
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plan denials to an independent review organization. Under their
original conception, independent review entities functioned to review
the scientific evidence and ensure that the MCO was not arbitrarily
refusing the prescribed service. The more recent external appeals
laws, however, feature various mechanisms that impose a greater bur-
den on health plans in justifying their medical necessity determina-
tions. These mechanisms include expanding the resources that ex-
ternal reviewers can use and placing the burden of persuasion on the
MCO. With the MCO decisionmakers on the defensive and the inde-
pendent reviewers acting more like patient advocates in the process,
patients and their physicians now find it correspondingly easier to
overturn an MCO denial. As independent reviewers increasingly im-
pose their own, patient-biased interpretation of what is "medically
necessary," the MCO's definition of medical necessity becomes less
significant. This process continues until the MCO implicitly agrees
with providers when they consider a proposed treatment unnecessary
and agrees with providers when they consider a proposed treatment
necessary. Medical necessity decisionmaking has returned to rules in-
herent in the traditional fee-for-service model.
The evidence surrounding the enactment of these various exter-
nal appeals laws reveals the legislators' tacit goals regarding the trans-
formation of independent review organizations from neutral arbiters
to active patient advocates. Senator Kennedy, for example, has ex-
pressed his aversion to health plans having the "final say" in medical
treatment decisions." ' Language in some of the more recent itera-
tions of the federal patient protection bills prohibits arbitrarily inter-
fering with or altering decisions of physicians regarding which services
are delivered or whether they are medically necessary."' By construct-
ing an external appeals process rhetorically and in substance more
hostile to MCO determinations, these policyrnakers hope to force
health plans to approve more proposed treatment plans by threaten-
ing them with a legitimate-and ultimately public-reexamination of
their internal decisionmaking processes.""
I- So Kristen Hallam, Lawmakers Define Medical Necessity, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Mar. 8, 1999, at 3 (paraphrasing Senator Kennedy's statements on the need for a pa-
tient bill of rights).
-" Sce Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, S. 1344, 106th Cong. § 151 (a) (1) (1999);
Promoting Responsible Managed Care Act of 1998, S. 2416, 105th Cong. § 102(b)(1).
,Su alu McGinley, supra note 52 (quoting Sen. Chafee's remark that health plans may
not arbitrarily alter the decisions of physicians).
_ So Nather, supra note 50, at 32 ("[S]upporters say external appeals will put the
fear of God into managed care plans. The plans will be more likely to approve appro-
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Thus, inspired by stories such as Mr. Benedetto's, legislators at the
state and federal levels have rejected MCOs' abilities to make their
own scientifically based medical necessity determinations. They have
passed numerous patient protection bills embracing external appeals
of adverse benefit determinations, relying on these bills as vehicles for
returning to the traditional health care delivery system in order to
improve patients' access to medical services recommended by their
physicians. Yet, the inherent characteristics of managed care and the
weaknesses of the external appeals process make it unlikely that these
widespread legislative efforts will effectively ensure that all patients re-
ceive truly "medically necessary" health services.
B. The Limitations of Using the Right of External Appeal to Impose a Fee-For-
Service Model of Medical Necessity Decision making
Numerous difficulties relating to the adverse benefit determina-
tion process and the right of external appeal call into question the ul-
timate ability of these new external appeals laws to provide patients
with better access to "medically necessary" services.
First, commentators such as Professor Marc Rodwin have pointed
out the remoteness of the external appeals system to the patients it is
meant to serve:
To bring an appeal, the consumer must know that he or she has either
been denied a service or received poor quality of care; believe that the
MCO has acted improperly; be hopeful that filing a grievance may pro-
vide a remedy; have the time and resources to pursue the matter; and
202
think it worth the cost of doing so.
Rodwin correctly observes that these factors "are often absent for
those who are ill, poor, or who lack education."2 3 Even among the
population of managed care enrollees as a whole, people have not ex-
pressed a desire to go through an appeals process: a Kaiser Family
Foundation survey indicated that only seventeen percent of managed
care enrollees said they wanted to appeal to an independent reviewer
when their plan did not cover a service.0 4 Patient advocates have tried
priate medical treatment, they say, because the decisions will have to stand up to an
outside review.").
202 Rodwin, supra note 20, at 1047.
23 Id.
2 See Nather, supra note 50, at 28, 30 (noting that most health plan enrollees do
not "go to the trouble" of appealing adverse determinations). Even in the largest
states with external appeals laws, fewer than 250 appeals are brought every' year. See
Rundle, supra note 59 (reporting the general lack of utilization of external review
rights).
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to argue that appeals decisions can have a "sentinel effect" on the be-
havior of health plans."'6 The decisions of reviewers, however, do not
carry the legal weight of binding precedent, and it is unclear whether
the express justifications, if any, for overturning a particular adverse
benefit determination offered by the external reviewers can be gener-
alized in practice. 2""
Second, even if these statistics merely reveal the fact that the ap-
peals process is not yet user-friendly or that its benefits have not been
well advertised to MCO enrollees, problems still remain. Ultimately,
many MCOs deny only a limited number of services recommended by
health care providers. By some counts, upwards of ninety-seven per-
cent of provider treatment decisions are authorized by MCOsYO7
Moreover, United Health Group, one of the country's largest HMOs,
has recently announced that it will forego prospective review of physi-
cian treatment decisions altogether.2"' MCOs' lack of significant reli-
ance on medical service denials indicates that health plans no longer
consider prospective or concurrent utilization review to be significant
sources of their control over access to medical treatment. Rather,
health plans have developed a much wider arsenal of methods to limit
costs and influence treatment decisions, including adjusting the reim-
bursement level for services2( and retrospectively reviewing provider
practices, backed up by the threat of termination of the provider's
contract with the plan.21"
Finally, some commentators have asserted that it is completely le-
gitimate for consumers to enter into contracts with health insurers
that use medical necessity standards as determined and enforced by
the MCO. As Professor Clark Havighurst argues:
[S]ome health insurance policies are appropriately conceptualized as
agreements by which members of the covered group mutually elected to
be bound in order that the fund created by their contributions would be
.. Rundle, supra note 59 (paraphrasing external appeals advocate Karen Pollitz,
who noted that to be effective, external appeals entities may not have to review thou-
sands of ca es).
Set, Rodwin, supra note 20, at 1048 (describing concerns about the effectiveness
of external appeals on general MCO practices regarding consumers).
S Miller, supra note 25, at 60-61 (discussing the HMO debate in Congress).
Sc' Milt Freudenheim, Big MA. 0. to Give Decisions on Care Back to Doctors, N.Y
TINIES, Nov. 9, 1999, at Al (reporting that United Health Group will phase out its pro-
spectixe utilization review of provider treatment decisions).
-, See supra note 30 and accompanying text (listing fixed payments for medical
servces as a cost-containment tactic of MCOs).
See Freudenheim, supra note 208 (recounting MCOs' varied cost-containment
strategies).
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sufficient to cover their essential needs and would not be squandered on
nonessential, inefficacious, or overly costly services demanded by any in-
dividual. Under this view, an insurer rationing health care financing by
invoking a coverage restriction can be seen as serving consumer interests
as well as its own.
By imposing an activist external appeals process on the MCO
benefit determination process, the legislative system is undermining
validly executed enrollee contracts with health plans.12  Havighurst
warns that such high-minded paternalism stifles further "responsible
economizing" in the provision of health services by limiting the
amount of risk that health plan subscribers can assume.213
Ultimately, then, legislators' attempts to impose the traditional
fee-for-service model of physician decisionmaking on the current
managed care health system through an activist external appeals pro-
cess likely will prove ineffective. Both practical deficiencies in the ex-
ternal appeals process itself, as well as more conceptual problems re-
garding interference with the health care contracting process, argue
against advancing patient rights through an empowered external ap-
peals process. While a more autonomous and activist external appeals
process can help in cases such as Mr. Benedetto's, it may not signifi-
cantly improve the position of the vast majority of patients with regard
to the imbalance of power between them and their MCOs. As a result,
the emphasis legislators have placed on delineating an ever-expanding
role for external appeals systems simply may result in the diversion of
resources from more pertinent patient protection measures. The leg-
islative efforts seem to be based misguidedly on media-friendly anec-
dotal stories such as Mr. Benedetto's rather than on the true charac-
teristics of the context of MCO medical necessity determinations.24"
C. Other Alethodologies for Administering Medical
Necessity Decision making
While the proponents of the current external appeals movement
211 Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to Acopt
Health Care Rationing Tomorrow , 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1755, 1771 (1992).
212 See CLARK C. HAVIGHURS, HEALTH CARE CHOICES 164 n.7 (1995) (criticizing
the "elitist" patient rights advocates who want to impose their ideas on validly executed
contracts).213 Id. at 146-47.
214 For a discussion of the perils of basing legislation on anecdotes, see generally
David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797 (1998) and David A.
Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRIX
29 (1998).
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might be implicitly pushing for a return to fee-for-service medical ne-
cessity decisionmaking, the experience of the crippling costs of the
pre-managed care 1970s and 1980s" indicate that even they might
not want a complete return to a fee-for-service medical regime." 6 Yet,
if an activist external appeals process appears ill-suited to the task of
overcoming the perceived bias of MCO medical necessity decision-
making, what is a better solution for making resource allocation de-
terminations?
One solution, discussed by Professor Hall, suggests the promulga-
tion of general standards of medical practice. These standards would
be composed by groups of experts to provide a more scientifically
217based guide for physicians in making treatment decisions. As Pro-
fessor Hall notes: "These technocratic experts might be capable of al-
locating wisely through cost-sensitive rules based on careful empirical
research. ",2  This proposal stems from the concerns of medical ethi-
cists who feel that it is morally troublesome to return to fee-for-service
medicine in modern, cost-conscious times and require providers or
patients to make care-rationing medical necessity decisions at the bed-
side. The expert panel scheme is superficially appealing. Since
fewer than twenty-five percent of so-called standard medical practices
actually have been subject to scientific proof,"2" providing physicians
with a comprehensive set of guidelines delineating recommended
treatment pathways will help allay the tensions between provider and
MCO decisionmaking on a more widespread level than the case-by-
case adjudication of the external appeals process. On the other hand,
Hall is quick to point out that these guidelines, if applied too literally,
might stifle the individualized decisionmaking critical to proper
medical practice.2 Also, many of the MCO/physician disagreements
over medical necessity arise in the context of novel, expensive thera-
"" See sources cited supra notes 24-26 (listing some of the factors contributing to
the skTocketing costs of the American healthcare system in the 1980s).
See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Whqo Should Determine When Health Care is Medically Nec-
,ariV, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229 (Jan. 21, 1999) ("We [do not] advocate ... a
return to total autonomy for treating physicians in determining insurance coverage.").
S ! MARK A. HKLL, MAIKNG MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 63-64 (1997) (noting
the increased use of third party experts to set spending limits for patients and propos-
ing a "hybrid between physician discretion and third-party rules").
Id. at 74.
Id. at 64 ("[Mlany prominent medical ethicists believe that external author-
ity... is at least morally superior to physicians or patients making their own rationing
decision at the bedside.").
ee id. at 74 (calling for more widespread medical technology assessment).
Id. at 77-104 (examining the competing merits of rules versus discretion).
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peutic options,"' and the applicability of these guidelines to new
technologies remains debatable. Thus, the "technocratic expert" '-3
model might be an effective alternative if regulators employ suffi-
ciently pliable expert standards of medical necessity and then place
the burden on the physician to justify a large-scale divergence from
these standards. Despite these concerns, however, using expert stan-
dards rather than MCO-determined standards of medical necessity
could serve as the basis for a more palatable process than the current
model, in which each patient/provider decision comes under the
scrutiny of utilization review.
Another analytical approach, endorsed by Professor Havighurst,
involves using contract law to have patients decide for themselves the
level of services they wish to purchase: "[I] t should be possible for dif-
ferent health plans, using contractual tools to adjust the intensity level
of the care provided, to cover at significantly different prices the full
range of medical conditions encompassed in a standardized, compre-
hensive benefit package. '224 The contract model can allow consumers
to "select the plan whose general policy toward risks and benefits best
suits individual preferences and willingness to pay the marginal cost of
more generous coverage."2 It also would force health plans to dis-
close their often arcane procedures for determining coverage deci-
226sions. However, while using contract principles would help patients
escape the sweeping generalizations of health management by profes-
sional guidelines, it raises its own set of concerns, such as the ability of
consumers to make the sort of prospective, fine-tuned decisions about
their health these elaborate contracting mechanisms require.2 7 Still,
2,2 See Denise S. Wolf, Who Should Pay for "Experimental" Treatments? Breast Cancer
Patients v. Their Insurers, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (1995) (discussing cost issues
surrounding the use of bone marrow transplants as a treatment for advanced stage
breast cancer, a therapeutic strategy whose efficacy has not yet been conclusively
proven).
HALL, supra note 217, at 74.
'2 HAVIGHURST, supra note 212, at 180.
2 Id. at 241.
2" See id. at 185 (describing the benefits of a more rigorous contracting process);
see also Guy Boulton, Two Lawsuits Aim to Force Health Insurers to Reveal Criteria for Dening
Claims, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 11, 1999, at Al (reporting two recent Utah district court
class action suits aimed at promoting transparency in the claim assessment process).
For example, over two-thirds of Americans in MCOs receive their health insur-
ance through their employers, who generally present a small number of MCO options
for employees. See Furrow, supra note 158, at 507 (noting that employees are usually at
the mercy of their employers when it comes to selecting MCOs). Limiting potential
MCO enrollees to a small number of options in selecting a managed care plan under-
mines the ideal risk-contracting situation in which consumers freely choose among a
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the basic features of a contract-based proposal-using restructured
contracts to allow consumers to make informed decisions about their
level of medical coverage, rather than placing the interpretation of
vague language in the hands of their health plan-successfully em-
powers patients in their attempts to receive the proper level of medi-
cal coverage from their health insurance plans.
Common among these alternate proposals for restructuring the
troubled managed care medical necessity decisionmaking apparatus is
the emphasis on the same basic patient protections sought by the
proponents of the strengthened external appeals process. These
goals, which include making sure that coverage determinations have a
scientific basis and promoting the interests of patients over potentially
biased MCOs, are sufficiently important to warrant being addressed
through a more wholesale, direct restructuring of the health insur-
ance system. This solution is ultimately what Professors Hall,
Havighurst, and others:2" are advocating. As it is, by expanding the
authority and discretion of the external appeals process, legislators
seem to be trying to impose a back-door fee-for-service decisionmak-
ing system on the current health insurance process. While legislators'
efforts are valuable in their basic convictions and may help resolve
particular cases such as Mr. Benedetto's, the limitations of the appeals
process suggest that current legislative resources being spent on the
external appeals paradigm may be better directed toward other sug-
gested solutions to the managed care coverage determination di-
lemma.
CONCLUSION
In response to the perceived excesses of the managed care indus-
try in making overly restrictive benefit determinations of which medi-
cal services are "medically necessary"--due in large part to media-
driven anecdotal stories such as Mr. Benedetto's-state and federal
legislators have promoted patient protection acts granting, as one of
their main provisions, the right of MCO enrollees to an independent,
external appeal of all such decisions. Over the past few years, these
statutes and bills have bequeathed an expanding range of authority
and discretion to these external reviewers, granting them increasing
latitude to cast an ever more critical eye on the presumptively biased
number of MCOs to modulate precisely their desired level of health care coverage.
S- ,.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM.
J.L. & MED. 79, 79 (1994) (arguing that the time has come for a new, multifaceted-
rather than phsician-centered-approach to defining health care quality).
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decisionmaking of MCOs. The legislative trend toward enhancing the
position of the independent reviewers can be interpreted as an im-
plicit attempt on the part of legislators to impose, indirectly, the rules
of traditional medical necessity decisionmaking on health plans.
While a more powerful external appeals process may have aided
Mr. Benedetto, inherent practical and theoretical barriers likely will
prevent the independent review process, regardless of how much dis-
cretion state or federal legislatures cede to it, from affecting most
managed care enrollees and the medical services offered to them un-
der normal circumstances. Given these concerns, it would be irre-
sponsible for legislators not to follow these anecdote-driven legislative
efforts with more fundamental alterations to the system-alterations
that can have a wider impact on the quality of Americans' health care.
